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Loan and Project Summary
Borrower: Korea Development Bank (KDB)
Guarantor: Republic of Korea
Amount: $100 million equivalent
Terms: The proposed loan will bear interest at 9.25% p.a., amorti-
zation to conform substantially to the aggregate of the
amortization schedules applicable to the specific invest-
ment projects financed out of the proceeds of the proposed
loan.
Relending terms; KDB will on-lend the proceeds of the loan to subborrowers
at an interest rate two percentage points above the weighted
average cost of foreign funds to KDB for a maximum period
of 13 years, including 3 years of grace. Subborrowers will
assume the foreign exchange risk.
Project
description: The proposed project incorporates a package of financial
sector policy measures which would be implemented by the
Government, as a part of a comprehensive reform of the
financial system of Korea. The proposed loan would be
used to help cover the foreign exchange requirements of
subprojects to be financed by KDB over the next two years.
In order to encourage a reduction in KDB's reliance on
long-term official borrowings, the proposed loan would
incorporate a special amortization feature, which would
permit the blending of Bank and commercial resources.
There are no special risks associated with the project.
Estimated dis- Bank FY: 1981 1982 1983 1984
bursements: ------------ ($ million) --------
Annual 13.0 51.0 34.0 2.0
Cumulative 13.0 64.0 98.0 100.0
Staff Appraisal
Report: No. 3106-KO, dated November 20, 1980.
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REPORT AND RECOMIENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED FOURTH LOAN
TO THE KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK WITH THE GUARANTEE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
fourth loan to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) with the guarantee of the
Republic of Korea for the equivalent of $100.0 million. The loan will bear
interest at 9.25% p.a. and will be amortized substantially in accordance with
the aggregate of the amortization schedules applicable to the specific
investment projects financed out of its proceeds. The maximum repayment
period applicable to subborrowers would be 13 years, including 3 years of
grace.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
2. The latest Economic Report entitled "Korea: Current Developments
and Policy Issues" was distributed under cover of SecM80-449, dated May 20,
1980. The Country Data Sheets are attached as Annex 1.
Past Performance and Emerging Structural Problems
3. During the last two decades, Korea achieved remarkable economic
progress. At the beginning of the 1960s, the country was suffering from the
typical vicious circle of poverty. GNP was about $80 per capita and exports
only $41 million. During the following 17 years, 1962-78, real GNP grew by
9.4% p.a., exports by 40% p.a., and industrial production by about 20% p.a.
In 1978, per capita GNP exceeded the thousand dollar mark, exports were
above $10 billion, the net foreign capital inflow was only about 15% of
total imports, the rate of unemployment was down to 3.2% and the ratio of
population below the poverty level was estimated to be under 15%.
4. Korea succeeded in achieving a high rate of growth between 1973
and 1978 despite a total dependency on imports for its petroleum needs and
the quadrupling of oil import prices between 1972 and 1974. Korea's oil
import bill grew to $1.10 billion in 1974, absorbing 22% of export receipts.
The terms of trade worsened by about 23% between 1972 and 1974 leading to
slightly over 4% of GNP loss. In spite of this, Korea succeeded in
maintaining a GNP growth rate of 8% in 1974 and about 10% p.a. during
1974-78. Notwithstanding the recession in developed countries and growing
protectionism, Korea's exports in dollar terms grew by 38% in 1974 and by
32% p.a. during 1974-78. The ratio of foreign savings to GNP which rose to
12.4% in 1974 (from about 4% in 1973) declined to 3.3% in 1978. Throughout
this period, the rate of unemployment continued to decline and the
investment-income ratio during 1974-78 was higher (29%) than during the
preceding five years (26%).
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5. Among the policy instrunents which contributed to Korea's success
in very rapidly overcoming the effects of the first oil crisis were: (a)
increased borrowing from abroad in order to maintain the momentum of growth;
(b) devaluation in 1973 and 1974; (c) restraint in wage increases in 1974
and 1975 when real wages in mining and manufacturing increased by 5.1% p.a.
and labor productivity by 10.5% p.a.; (d) an increase in government savings
from 2.3% of GNP in 1974 to 6.5% of GNP in 1978; and (e) continued emphasis
on export diversification in products as well as markets. In addition to
these policy adjustments, the Korean economy also gained from (a) an
improvement in terms of trade and (b) a spectacular growth in overseas
construction contracts which stood at $15 billion at the end of 1978 and
yielded gross earnings of about $2.2 billion.
6. However, the very success of the Korean planners in stimulating
exports, investment and growth during 1975-78 seriously strained the
economy. Between 1975 and 1978 the real domestic demand (consumption,
investment and exports) expanded by an unprecedented 60%. Both the volume
of exports and the level of real fixed investment doubled over these three
years and purchasing power of exports improved as terms of trade showed a
recovery of 28%. Such a rapid expansion in demand, along with multiplier
effects understandably created bottlenecks in the economy and fuelled
inflationary pressures. Labor markets witnessed a major transformation in
this period. Non-agricultural employment expanded by 30% between 1975 and
1978, and employment in the critical construction sector increased by 55%
during 1977 and 1978. Reflecting the tightening of the labor market, money
wages in manufacturing increased by 33% p.a. during 1977-79 and real wages
clearly outstripped the growth in productivity. The constraint on the
supply of housing together with fast accelerating demand, led to very sharp
increases in prices of dwellings. Structural factors such as shifts in the
pattern of demand and bottlenecks in the supply of agricultural products
such as meat and vegetables put further pressures on consumer prices. The
sharp rise in Korea's price level compared with the major trading partners
in turn eroded export competitiveness and led to a major deterioration in
the balance of payments. Only a part of the widening of the current
account deficit from $1.1 billion in 1978 to $4.2 billion in 1979 was
attributable to an increase in the oil import bill. The basic underlying
factors were the stagnation in the volume of exports and rapidly rising
nonoil imports reflecting continuation of a major investment boom till the
third quarter of 1979. Since early 1979, the Government has been concerned
about the excessive investment and overheating of the economy and initially
made efforts to reduce inflation through containing domestic expenditures.
The April 1979 stabilization cum restructuring program focussed on tight
monetary and fiscal policies. The growing weakness in the export demand and
the sharp rise in oil prices were, however, not foreseen and thus the
economy slowed down much more than expected, the inflation rates stayed
high and the balance of payments emerged as a serious constraint.
7. The difficult economic situation prevailing in 1979 was further
aggravated by the second oil crisis and the political problems emerging in
1979/80. As a result of the increase in the price of oil, Koreas annual
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oil import bill rose from about $3 billion in 1979 to about $6 billion in
1980. The deterioration in the terms of trade amounted to a loss of GNP of
about 4% between 1978 and 1980. Moreover, the oil price increase contributed
to a slowing down of the growth rate of the industrialized countries and to
an acceleration of their rates of inflation. The prospects for world trade
in manufactures deteriorated and for an economy like Korea's, where growth
has been led by exports, this amounted to a significant worsening of growth
prospects. At the same time, the months between the October 1979 assassin-
ation of President Park and the inauguration of the present administration
in September were marked by a high degree of political uncertainty and civil
unrest.
8. Under the combined impact of the adverse economic and political
events, the economy went into a recession: the seasonally adjusted GNP, as
well as nonagricultural GDP, declined in each of the last three quarters of
1979. Notwithstanding the recessionary tendencies wholesale and consumer
prices rose by over 18% during 1979, compared to 12-14% increase during
1978. The current account balance of payments deficit widened sharply from
$1.1 billion in 1978 to $4.2 billion, or about 7% of GNP, in 1979. The
nature of the current economic difficulties and some key policy issues were
reviewed in the latest Bank economic report which concluded that in order to
tackle the serious problems created by the past structural imbalances and
the oil crisis, it would be necessary to adopt measures for a restructuring
of the economy aimed at improving efficiency, controlling inflation and
improving the balance of payments position. Among the needed measures that
the report identified were: (a) a review of the investment pattern in the
heavy industries sector, (b) restructuring agricultural income support
programs, (c) improved energy efficiency through proper pricing as well as
energy saving investments, and (d) reform of the financial system. As noted
below, the Government has taken a series of measures in 1980 both to
revitalize the economy and addresss the structural issues. In spite of
these measures, however, it is expected that the rate of growth of GNP in
1980 will be negative (-2%), the rate of inflation (wholesale prices) about
40% and current account deficit about $5.5 billion.
Policy Measures Taken in 1980
9. In its attempt to correct the emerging structural imbalances and
to respond to the oil price hikes, the Government, initiated a series of
policy actions in 1980, in three phases. At the beginning of the year,
within the overall framework of a "stabilization first" policy, the
Government introduced changes in the exchange rate, interest rates and
energy prices in order to respond to the changing structure of international
prices. In June, the Government moved to increase public expenditure and
relax credit ceilings to tackle the growing problems of unemployment and
declining industrial production. The third phase came a few weeks after
the current administration took office in September 1980 and was character-
ized by a more active program for the revitalization of the economy through
promotion of exports and of construction industry and consolidation of the
heavy industries sector through mergers. Prospects for the effective
implementation of this program are heightened by the fact that the new
Government includes a number of highly experienced and competent
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individuals. The Prime Minister served in key Cabinet positions during most
of the 1970s and is identified with the formulation and application of the
imaginative and bold policies which enabled Korea to surmount the difficul-
ties posed by the first oil crisis of 1974/75. Some details of the measures
adopted during these three phases are noted below.
10. Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Energy Prices. In January
1980, the won was devalued by about 20% from W 484 to W 580 per US$1. This
was followed in February by a new exchange rate system under which the value
of the won would be determined on the basis of a basket of currencies
(consisting of SDR and a sub-basket of currencies reflecting the shares of
the countries in Korea's merchandise trade) although other factors such as
relative price movements could also be taken into account. The new system
has given flexibility to Korea's exchange rate and the dollar value of the
won has declined by about 10% since February 1980. In January 1980, interest
rates were also raised by about 6 percentage points for most lending and
deposit rates. Subsequently there have been some minor downward adjustments
in interest rates; however, at present, the prime lending rate stands at
about 21 percent, which is higher than the expected rate of inflation for
the year ahead. In response to rapidly rising oil import prices, the
Government had already raised domestic oil prices by about 75% in 1979.
In January 1980 the prices were raised again by about 60%, bringing the
total increase in one year to over 170%.
11. Demand Management. At the beginning of 1980, the Government was
pursuing an extremely tight monetary policy. In spite of the substantial
increase in domestic prices, due to the energy price increases and devalua-
tion, the rate of growth of money supply (M2) was to be kept at the
target of 20% in 1980. In order to restrain the budget deficit, Government
expenditures were to be cut back, with principal emphasis on reducing
expenditures with a low employment impact or high fuel or import intensity.
Hlowever, by mid-year, concerned at the rising unemployment and declining
industrial production, the Government eased the monetary and fiscal squeeze.
In response to the Bank's suggestions for flexible monetary policy and in
agreement with the IMF, the target growth rate of M2 for 1980 was raised
to 25%. W 112.7 billion of budget expenditures frozen earlier was made
available for public works programs and additional credit were made available
for small and medium industries and for construction of housing units,
particularly for low income families. Further incentives for residential
construction were given in September by reducing the rate of capital gains
tax on real estate transfer (from 50-80% to 35-75%), and increased funds
were made available to Korea Housing Bank and the Korea Land Development
Corporation. To promote exports, loans per dollar of letter of credit for
exports were increased and the banks were asked to pool resources for
providing performance guarantees requested by domestic companies for
overseas construction contracts, and for helping exports of heavy and
chemical industries on a deferred payment basis.
12. Protecting Livelihood of the Poor. Throughout the year, with
growing unemployment and rising prices, the Government has adopted various
measures to alleviate the economic strain on the poor. Among these measures
were: expansion of public works programs; various subsidy schemes on
essential goods and services such as rice, coal briquettes and bus service;
program for increasing imports of major grains and giving tariff reductions
on some essential commodities; and increase in interest rates on special
savings programs for low income families.
13. Industrial Rationalization Program. The new administration has
moved to tackle the very difficult issues arising from recent excessive
investment in some heavy industries. It has issued instructions for
consolidation in six industries, namely, automobiles, power generation
equipment, copper smelting, heavy electrical equipment, electronic switching
systems, and marine diesel engines. Since all these operations are
privately-owned, the Government instructions for mergers will involve
complicated changes in ownership, licensing arrangements, contractual
relationships and management patterns. In a move to encourage greater
equity financing, the Government will disallow the treatment of interest
payments as expenses in the calculation of tax liability for firms which are
already too heavily leveraged. The larger companies will be required to
register all land owned and the land found unnecessary by the Government for
the companies operations will have to be sold and the proceeds of these
sales used for improving debt equity ratios of these firms.
14. Expansion of Social Development Expenditure. The new administra-
tion proposes to expand rapidly expenditures in the areas of education,
housing, health and social welfare. It has announced a large increase in
enrollment quotas for higher education, reform of the private tutoring system,
and an expansion of the medical insurance program.
15. The Government is in the process of formulating the next Five Year
Plan which will cover the years 1982-86./i The objectives of the plan are
restoration of growth momentum along with equity through employment
generation and increased social development expenditures. The general
strategy is to increase efficiency of resource use by opening up the economy
to greater international competition, by liberalization of the financial
system and by promotion of the competitive system in domestic production and
marketing. The emphasis on heavy and chemical industries would continue but
will be combined with efforts at consolidation of the industrial structure
and promotion of science and technology. Energy conservation and substi-
tution for oil will receive major attention. The income support program for
the poor (including rural income support program) would gradually shift from
generalized subsidy programs to targetted investment and income transfer
programs. There would be greater efforts than in earlier plans on reducing
regional imbalances, meeting basic needs, tackling urban problems such as
housing, transport and water supply and environmental pollution and
development of a social security system.
/1 The Bank is the executing agency for a UNDP-financed program for
assistance to the Fifth Plan formulation. This assistance involves
mobilizing some 30 foreign consultants to advise on some selected
aspects of the Plan and organizing training programs for Koreans
at selected institutions abroad.
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External Capital Requirements
16. At a recently held meeting of the Consultative Group for Korea,
there was a concensus that in spite of the current difficulties, Korea's
longer term prospects remain good. Among the sources of strengths for the
economy are: a large investment base, the young and rapidly growing labour
force, the scope for exports of capital goods including construction
equipment, and, above all, the skill and dedication of its labour force, the
dynamism of its private sector. It is generally recognised, however, that
even with strenuous Government efforts for structural adjustment, Korea's
balance of payments can improve only over a period of several years. The
current account deficit in balance of payments is expected to remain about
$5 billion per year during the next few years. Allowing for debt service
and addition to reserves, the gross external capital inflows required during
1980-81 are estimated to be about $7.5 billion per year, of which about $1.3
billion could be expected from public sources (excluding Ex-Im banks but
including IMF), and the rest from private sources.
17 While Korea is extending its use of commercial financing from
traditional suppliers and private bank credits to Euro-dollar syndicated loans
and bond issues in the Euro-bond and Asian bond market and is expected to
derive an increasing proportion of its total requirements from such sources,
the magnitude of these external capital requirements is such that it will
have to continue to rely on considerable capital inflows from official
sources. It should, however, be emphasized that the higher anticipated
levels of external capital inflow (relative to the Fourth Plan targets) are
a consequence of its higher investment rates rather than a shortfall in the
domestic savings rate. The ratio of foreign savngs to GNP is expected to
decline in the eighties, following the restructuring and readjustment
planned for the next few years. Servicing of the debt should not pose
difficulties given the present debt service ratio and the continuing
emphasis on export growth, provided that the proportion of external debt
incurred on shorter term and at high interest rates is not excessive. The
projected ratio of debt service payments to total export earnings is expected
to remain below 16% throughout the eighties.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS
18. As of July 31, 1980, Korea had received 52 Bank Loans (including
one Third Window Loan) and 8 IDA Credits, totalling $2,945.2 million in loans
and $106.8 million in credits (taking into account cancellations and the
refinancing of one IDA Credit in a subsequent Bank Loan). As of that date,
$976.0 million of the total Bank lending remained undisbursed on effective
Loans and Credits, mostly from commitments in the past two years. Annex II
contains a summary statement of Bank Loans, IDA Credits, and IFC Investments
as of that date and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated
in the notes, progress on project implementation is generally satisfactory.
19. In recent years, the thrust of the Bank Group's lending operations
in Korea has been directed towards assisting the Government's efforts: (a) to
secure the external resources required to supplement domestic savings in
sustaining a high GNP growth rate by following a policy of rapid export-
oriented industrialization; (b) to avoid the emergence of infrastructure
bottlenecks; and (c) to complement industrial development with agricultural
and rural development schemes aimed at bringing about a better dispersal of
the fruits of growth through raising incomes and improving the quality of life
in the rural areas.
20. A substantial part of Bank financing has been directed towards the
vital industrial sector through lending to Korea's four major development
banks. The Korea Long-Term Credit Bank (KLTCB) /1 has received $320.0 mil-
lion, the Korea Development Bank (KDB) $252.5 million, the Small and Medium
Industry Bank (SMIB) $145 million in Bank loans for relending to private
industry and the Citizens National Bank (CNB) $30 million to meet the
financial needs of the small enterprises. The primary beneficiaries of these
loans have been the numerous industrial enterprises which have received funds
through the financial intermediaries. This has resulted in the overall
development of the industrial sector, and also contributed to the achievement
of institutional improvements as well as the Government's objective of decen-
tralizing industry.
21. As Korea's economy continued to grow and the pace of industriali-
zation has quickened, there has had to be a parallel expansion of transport
facilities. The Bank Group, through its association with the Government's
efforts to modernize and expand the transport sector dating back to 1962, has
played an important role in these developments. In addition to the recently
approved loan of $94 million for the seventh railway project, some $340 mil-
lion had been provided for six railway projects designed to increase the
railroad-s capacity and improve its operations; four loans totalling $334.5
million have been made for highway construction and paving of high priority
sections of the national network and for a countrywide maintenance
organization; and two loans amounting to $147 million have been provided for
the expansion of port facilities at Busan and Mugho.
22. Korea-s paucity of natural resources and dependence on the manufac-
turing segment of its economy have resulted in the adoption of a strategy
based on maximizing the advantages of a skilled and hardworking labor force.
The Bank Group has been involved in helping to meet the requirements for
appropriately trained workers and certain categories of skilled manpower
through its lending for four education projects, which have pursued the broad
objectives of technical manpower development either through the expansion of
relevant subsectors or through specific quality improvements. Together, these
projects have catered to a wide range of manpower training needs.
/1 Previously called the Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC).
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23. Korea-s record of achievement in modernizing its agricultural
sector, although less spectacular than the gains made in the industrial
sphere, is nevertheless commendable. The past 15 years have seen agri-
cultural output grow at about 4% per annum, which has resulted in the
country's becoming near self-sufficient in its staple food, rice, and made
possible a steady and perceptible improvement in the living standards of the
40% of Korea's population who live in the countryside and rely primarily on
agrarian pursuits for their livelihood. The Bank has lent $325.5 million for
the improvement of irrigation facilities, land and seed development and the
provision of agricultural credit to farmers and processors of agricultural
products. In addition, $155 million has been provided for two rural infra-
structure projects in support of the Government's rural development program,
initiated in 1971, to improve the quality of life and the standard of living
in the rural areas. Recently a $125 million loan was provided by the Bank to
help meet the growing demand for municipal, industrial and irrigation water in
the Han Basin southeast of the capital city, Seoul; reduce flood damage; and
generate electricity to augment and provide peaking capacity for Korea's power
system.
24. The Bank's first essay into the field of regional development in
Korea, through the project approved in January 1975 (Loan 1070-KO), has proved
successful. The project was designed to support the Government's policy by
financing high priority investments in the poor, primarily agricultural,
southwest region. A loan of $65 million for a second project for the devel-
opment of the region was approved by the Executive Directors in
September 1979.
25. Excluding one project that was cancelled subsequently, IFC had, by
July 31, 1980, entered into 28 commitments, totalling $67.9 million (net of
participations and cancellations). Korea's industrial development programs
have required large capital expenditures in the private sector, a situation
which has enabled a substantially enhanced IFC presence in the past few years.
26. A primary objective of the Bank's future lending to Korea is to
provide assistance in sustaining the growth momentum and in addressing the
emerging issues which the Korean economy is facing. The maturity of many of
the Korean institutions suggests that it would be appropriate to adopt a
sector lending approach in some areas along the lines of the recently
approved loan for higher technical education which will contribute to the
modernization and improvement of the system of higher technical education so
as to increase its flexibility and responsiveness to the changing
requirements of the economy.
27. Another strand in the lending strategy is increased support of the
Government-s efforts to spread the fruits of growth even more equitably by
the diversification and expansion of the output of the agricultural sector
and through nationwide development programs. To support such diversification
and expansion, projects are envisaged for land/water resource development, for
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agricultural credit and marketing, for low-income housing, and for the further
development of rural infrastructure and facilities in selected provincial
areas, which would enhance incomes and quality of life in the lesser developed
regions of the country and would have a significant impact on the problems of
migration to the major metropolitan areas.
28. The further development of the industrial and agricultural sectors
and the anticipated growth of exports will require concurrent infrastructural
development. Although the transport sector will be given less emphasis than
in the past, the investments required are large and, thus, there is consider-
able support for this sector in the proposed lending program.
29. The share of the Bank Group in Korea-s total external debt disbursed
and outstanding at the end of 1979 was about 13%, and its share of debt
service was of the order of 5% at that time. These ratios are expected to be
around 8% and 6% respectively, by the mid-eighties.
PART III - THE INDUSTRIAL AND FINANCIAL SECTORS
The Industrial Sector
30. Korea's growth strategy has been based on the expansion of in-
dustrial activity with emphasis on the promotion of manufactured exports.
Rapid growth in GNP at about 10% p.a. in real terms during the last two
decades has induced considerable structural change in the economy. The
growth of the manufacturing sector, at 18% p.a. over the period 1962-79, has
transformed a predominantly agricultural economy into one in which mining and
manufacturing play an important role and account for 34% of GNP.
31. In the early 1960s, Korea's exports were insignificant. In 1965,
commodity exports totalled $181 million, of which manufactures accounted for
just over half. By 1979, commodity exports reached $15.1 billion; 90% of
these consisted of manufactures representing 27% of manufacturing output.
Although Korea-s export pattern continued to display a high degree of
reliance on a few labor-intensive traditional exports (textiles, clothing,
footwear, plywood and certain miscellaneous manufactures), there has also
been a discernible movement in the direction of more sophisticated
skill-intensive products. Items such as electrical machinery, machine
tools, electronic goods and components, and transport equipment (including
ships), have been added to Korea's range of exports. At the same time, the
pursuit of backward linkages, usually from export products, has enabled
domestic production to replace imports in certain sectors, e.g., textiles,
apparel, sewing machines, certain metal products and chemicals, and in
particular segments of the basic metal, petrochemical and machinery
industries.
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32. Several factors have contributed to the remarkable performance of
the export-oriented industrial sector. They include: efficiency of factor
use (labor and capital) in manufacturing; heavy investment outlays in industry
with an average real growth rate of about 15% p.a. during the last decade;
rapid and steady increases in productivity levels; and the combination of
flexible exchange rate and export incentives which maintained the
profitability of Korean exports in the face of relatively high rates of
domestic inflation.
33. Korea's economy began to show definite signs of overheating in 1978.
Manufacturing investment, which had been increasing at a rate of 13.3% in real
terms over 1975-77, accelerated sharply by 63.4% in 1978. With hindsight it
may be averred that the growth of manufacturing investment was too rapid and
concentrated excessively in capital-intensive industries (such as heavy
machinery and petrochemicals) resulting in a steep rise in capital intensity
of output as well as increased inflationary pressures in 1978-79. The
manufacturing growth rate of 10.6% in 1979 was about half that in 1978. The
Government's expectation that the GNP growth rate will be negative in 1980
implies that the rate of growth of manufacturing output has been even more
sluggish in the first half of this year. The Government believes that a
number of structural factors affecting the industrial sector have contributed
to the slowdown. For instance, overcapacity is now apparent in some branches
of heavy industry and real wage increases have outstripped productivity gains
since the mid-seventies and caused an erosion of Korea's comparative
advantage in labor-intensive manufactured exports. The Government has begun
to formulate a structural adjustment program, one of the main objectives of
which will be to enable the industrial sector to continue in its role as the
major source of growth. The Bank has been consulted on this effort and
has under review the Government's request for a series of structural
adjustment loans. The Government-s plans to rationalize the structure of
heavy industry by promoting mergers of some of the firms involved and to
concentrate more heavily on the promotion of skill-intensive industries such
as engineering and electronics appear to be steps in the right direction.
Korea's well-trained labor force, the excellent record of its economic
management in adapting to changing circumstances, and the foothold it has
secured in growing markets such as the Middle East, augur well for its
industrial sector regaining its dynamism.
The Financial Sector
34. Korea's financial system and institutions have expanded rapidly in
step with the growth of the industrial sector: the consolidated assets of
the financial sector have increased by 13.8% p.a. in real terms over 1975-79
compared to a GNP growth of 11% p.a. Lending for industry has kept pace with
the heavy investment needs of the sector: manufacturing fixed investment
increased by an average of 45% p.a. in current prices over 1977-79 while the
increase in term lending (i.e. loans with a maturity exceeding one year)
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averaged 52% p.a. It is estimated that approximately 50% of manufacturing
fixed investment in 1979 was supplied by Korean financial institutions while
self-financing accounted for 30% and other sources of funds, including direct
overseas borrowings, accounted for the remaining 20%.
35. The Korean financial system is highly specialized. It comprises:
(a) banking institutions which along with the (central) Bank of Korea (BOK),
form the monetary system; and (b) nonbank institutions which do not take
deposits from the general public. Banking institutions comprise mainly the
commercial banks and a number of specialized banks which mobilize and
allocate funds to specific sectors of the economy (e.g., small-scale industry
and agriculture). The commercial banks are the main source of short- and
medium-term working capital for industry; the specialized banks are the major
purveyors of longer-term capital. The Bank has lent to two major specialized
banks dealing with smaller enterprises: SMIB and CNB. Together with the
BOK, banking institutions accounted for 73.8% of the financial sector's
assets in 1979. Nonbank financial institutions perform a more specialized
function of allocating resources, mainly long-term, to particular
sectors/branches of the economy and of mobilizing specific types of resources
(e.g. insurance and short term finance companies). KDB and KLTCB have been
the two main nonbank financial institutions meeting the long-term financing
needs of industry. At end 1979, they jointly accounted for 56% of the total
assets of nonbank financial institutions. They have played a major role in
the transfer of World Bank resources to industry.
36. Over the past twenty years, the financial system has played a
crucial role in Korea by providing the financial support necessary to
implement the Government's economic development strategy. The Government has
effectively used the financial system as a tool to implement its investment
decisions in both the public and private sectors. The financial system has
served Korea well in the past decade and a half during which its development
strategy has centered around the achievement of rapid rates of the growth of
manufactured output principally for export. The country's financial mechanism
which is characterized by a high degree of responsiveness to the Government's
priorities, has clearly played a major role in helping the manufacturing
sector to act as the major engine of growth. For instance, the operation of
the export credit system has been a vital ingredient of the phenomenal export
growth which has provided the foundation for the enormous expansion of the
economy since the mid-60s. The substantial degree of Government control
over the system has, however, contributed towards the creation of one of the
major problems with which Korea is now faced with - i.e., over investment in
certain segments of the manufacturing sector. In the latter half of the 70s,
the Government placed increasing emphasis in the development of heavy manu-
facturing and chemical industries. At that time, it was believed that Korea-s
comparative advantage would lie in these fields. Accordingly, the Government
used the financial system to funnel resources towards the new heavy and
chemical industries which were highly capital-intensive. The main instrument
used by the Government to effect this strategy was the National Investment
- 12 -
Fund (cf. para. 37 beiow). It is now evident that this policy culminated in
substantial over-investment in the heavy and chemical industries to the
detriment of Korea's prospects for continuing the economic success of the
past (cf. para. 33 above).
37. The Government fully owns or holds controlling participations in
the share capital of the major financial institutions including commercial
banks, specialized banks and KDB. It also effectively controls the
mobilization and allocation of resources by the financial system primarily
by: (a) administering the interest rate structure and the yields on deposits
and other instruments of resource mobilization; and (b) providing the
financial institutions with resources in the shape of funds earmarked for
specified purposes, e.g., in the case of monies originating from the National
Investment Fund (NIF) the Government stipulates the particular sectors or
subsectors (and, at times the individual firms) towards which these should be
directed. This "directed lending" system, which accounts for approximately
40% of total institutional lending, is administered through guidelines and
directives issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the BOK. The system
circumscribes the discretion exercised by financial institutions in their
allocation of funds. At least half of the directed loans are made at
rates of interest which are at levels below the market rate. Short-term
export credits and the NIF program are the main components of the system of
subsidized lending. The commercial banks are the main source of export
credits while nearly two-thirds of NIF loans to industry are channeled through
KDB.
38. Since its establishment in 1974, the NIF has gradually evolved into
a major source of long-term funds for the priority sectors of industry.
Total NIF loans outstanding reached $2.5 billion at end-1979, accounting for
30.5% of all outstanding term loans by KDB and banking institutions. NIF
resources are mobilized primarily through compulsory contributions by banking
institutions out of their deposit resources. NIF loans are aimed primarily at
restructuring and deepening the industrial sector; emphasis has been placed on
assisting heavy and chemical industries and a substantial part has been
allocated to power projects. NIF lending is presently handled by the
commercial banks, the specialized banks and KDB with respective shares in
outstanding NIF loans of 18%, 16% and 66% at the end of 1979.
39. The growth and development of the Korean financial system
has undoubtedly contributed to the country's economic success. However, the
rigidity of the directed lending system could well hamper it in responding
appropriately to the increasing complexity and sophistication of the Korean
economy. The Bank-s most recent economic report concluded that the
restoration of high economic growth in the 1980s is contingent upon a number
of structural adjustments in the economy. These include streamlining the
financial system and the reshaping of those segments of the industrial sector
in which overinvestment and inefficiencies have surfaced. The Government has
begun to address the basic issues of industrial investment and financial
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policies (cf. para. 33 above). It has announced its intention of effecting
a comprehensive reform of the financial system over the next few years with
emphasis on a liberalization of the operations of intermediaries, particularly
the commercial banks. A first step in this direction was taken in November
1979, with the enactment of the Long-Term Credit Bank Law which enables the
establishment of privately owned financial intermediaries specializing in term
lending and authorized to raise funds from the domestic market. KLTCB became
Korea's first long-term credit Bank in June 1980. Further, the Government
instituted a reform of the interest rate structure in January 1980. This move
was in keeping with the Government's overall policy of bringing interest rates
to a positive level in real terms.
40. In late 1979, the Government requested the Bank to undertake a
review of the Korean financial system and prepare recommendations on
appropriate policy measures aimed at increasing its efficiency. This review
was completed in mid-1980 and the Government is in general agreement with the
analysis and conclusions. One of the major findings was that the control
exercised by the Government on individual financial institutions and on fund
allocation was too rigid and constrained their operational autonomy and
investment decision-making capability. For example, the Government
specifies interest rates which individual institutions can charge. One
result has been that interest spreads on money raised through the sale of
KDB-s industrial finance debentures have in many cases been negative. This
and other anomalies arising from Government control over interest rate
spreads, as well as measures which have been agreed to deal with them, are
further detailed in paras. 46 and 47 below.
41. Interest rate subsidies have had a number of negative effects.
Firstly, access to cheap credit has resulted in project sponsors limiting
their equity contributions to individual schemes and thus helping to cause
the high level of indebtedness which characterizes Korea's corporate sector
rendering numerous firms financially fragile. The increased vulnerability
of the typical Korean enterprise can be gauged by the fact that average debt
equity ratios rose from 2.7:1 in 1973 to 3.6:1 in 1978. Secondly, they have
contributed to overinvestment in certain areas of manufacturing (see
discussion in paras. 33 and 36 above). Another recommendation flowing from
the financial sector review was that direct government intervention in
allocative decisions be reduced and that the availability of "subsidized/
directed" credit be confined to clearly defined priority areas of the
industrial sector; to this end, the NIF program (para. 38) should be scaled
down and fund allocation should be rationalized. The other source of
subsidized funds, the short-term export credit program, has also had too
broad a focus and would need to be reassessed in the context of Korea's
overall export promotion strategy (cf. para. 48 below). Also, the
mobilization of domestic currency resources by financial institutions should
be encouraged through the maintenance of interest rates at positive real
levels. Other major recommendations relate to granting commercial banks
greater autonomy in their operation, placing more stress on term
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tranformation of deposits and the internationalization of Korea's capital
markets. Understandings reached between the Bank and the Government on these
recommendations are discussed in paras.45-48.
The Bank's Role in Korea's Financial Sector
42. Four development finance institutions operate in the industrial
sector. The government-owned CNB and SMIB specialize in assisting the smaller
end of the industrial spectrum. Larger enterprises, with employment exceeding
300 persons and assets of more than W 500 million ($860,000) are eligible for
long-term financial support from KDB. The privately owned KLTCB has also
concentrated on assisting relatively large firms; unlike KDB, however, it was
not precluded from financing smaller borrowers and has done so in a few
instances. The Bank has made loans to all four development finance
institutions which, in aggregate, supplied over 50% of all loans with a
maturity of more than one year to the manufacturing sector in 1977-78. Bank
lending to smaller scale industries through SMIB and CNB was initiated in
1975 and 1980, respectively. Lending to larger-scale firms started in 1967
with the first Bank loan to KLTCB. KDB became a Bank borrower in 1975. Seven
Bank loans aggregating $320 million have been made to KLTCB and three loans
for a total of $252.5 million to KDB. Through its support of KDB and KLTCB,
the Bank has made a significant contribution to the growth of industry in
Korea and to the development of the financial system. All these projects
have been implemented well and have contributed to the growth of the
development banks into capable and mature institutions.
43. The proposed operation is aimed at transcending the two major
objectives of the Bank's past lending to financial intermediaries in Korea -
resource-transfer and institution building. Simultaneous negotiation of the
KDB IV and KLTCB projects afforded the Bank an opportunity to reach a
common understanding with the Government regarding Korea-s long-term strategy
for improving efficiency in the financial sector. The understandings
reached include a series of policy measures which are described in the
paragraphs below.
44. The system of government-directed lending through NIF will be
reorganized and rationalized. The Government intends to thoroughly examine
and evaluate the NIF program. It intends to carry out no later than December
31, 1981, detailed industrial sector and subsector studies aimed at defining
priority areas for NIF lending. The Government will consult with the Bank on
the study's terms of reference and recommendations. The Government intends to
cease providing NIF resources to Korean commercial banks which lack the
requisite appraisal and implementation capacity to ensure efficient use of
these funds. The Government has agreed to furnish by December 31, 1981 a
time-phased plan to achieve this objective by the end of 1984. KDB will
also establish within its present organizational set-up a special unit to
monitor the performance of NIF borrowers and to help conduct the NIF
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study. The understanding reached on these matters are spelt out in Sections
3.03(a) and (b) of the Loan Agreement and in a Supplemental Letter to the
Guarantee Agreement entitled "Financial Sector Policy Improvements." These
measures are expected to increase the autonomy of the commercial banks in
making investment decisions and to enable the Government and KDB to implement
a more limited and sharply focused NIF program.
45. Increased mobilization of long-term domestic currency resources by
financial intermediaries, including KDB and KLTCB, is to be encouraged. At
present the cost of issuing term debentures is too high to allow onlending
with a sufficient positive interest spread. It was agreed that the lending
rate for loans funded with such resources would be set at such a level so
as to allow a positive spread (Section 3.04 of the Guarantee Agreement).
This measure is expected to enhance the resource mobilization capability of
financial institutions and the development of the capital markets in Korea.
The Bank loan to KLTCB would support this institution during the time when it
will be initiating efforts to mobilize domestic resources and to expand its
local currency lending.
46. Government policy regarding foreign exchange financing through
the specialized and development banks, to date, has required that foreign
loans from official sources to these intermediaries be onlent at a uniform
spread of 2%. Given the substantially divergent terms of foreign borrowings
from different sources, the result is that various subborrowers, from the
same institutions at the same time, ostensibly similar in essential
characteristics, obtain funds on different terms - albeit all more favorable
(exchange risk aside) than those for nonconcessional domestic credits. It
was agreed during negotiations that the lending rate applicable to foreign
currency loans funded with official borrowings would be rationalized by
imposing a 2% interest spread over the weighted average cost of
official resources available to KDB and KLTCB for future lending (Schedule 3
to the Loan Agreement). This formula is expected to remedy the inconsis-
tencies in lending rates which prevail at present. Concurrently, the
interest spread currently authorized by the Government for onlending foreign
commercial resources which is much lower than 2% and is insufficient to cover
handling costs would also be the (2%) level allowed for foreign official
borrowings. This harmonization of interest spreads is expected to increase
the incentive for mobilization of foreign commercial borrowings.
47. The availability of cheap subsidized credit has encouraged a high
dependence of Korean industries on debt financing which has resulted in a
high indebtedness of the corporate sector and a fragile financial structure
(cf. para. 40 above). In order to alleviate this problem and increase the
capitalization of industry, it was agreed during negotiations to limit access
to Bank funds to subborrowers with debt/equity ratios not in excess of 5:1
(Schedule 3 of the draft Loan Agreement).
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48. Additional studies and analyses of selected financial sector
issues will also need to be carried out so as to form the basis of a
continuing dialogue on financial policies. The Government has agreed to
conduct a series of studies covering the following topics: (a) the
short-term export credit system in the context of Korea's export promotion
strategy; (b) the future role of commercial banks in the financial system,
which envisages allowing them increased autonomy in their operation and
stresses term transformation of deposits; and (c) the internationalization
of Korea's capital markets. Draft terms of reference for the studies are to
be prepared and submitted to the Bank for comments by June 30, 1981
(Supplemental Letter to the Guarantee Agreement).
PART IV - THE PROJECT
Background and Project Objectives
49. In addition to providing a framework for reaching understandings
with the Government on the financial sector issues described in Part III,
the proposed loan would supply a part of the long-term funds required
to meet the needs of KDB's borrowers. Korea's increasing production costs
relative to its competitors have induced the Government to promote a
restructuring of the industrial sector towards skill and technology
intensive industries. This type of investment usually has a rather long
gestation period and requires long-term financing which cannot be obtained
from commercial sources. The institutional aspects of the project were
appraised in February 1979. In April 1979, a Bank mission discussed with
the Government the sectoral context and financial policy measures which
form an integral part of the proposed project.
50. A Report entitled "Staff Appraisal Report on the Korea Development
Bank" (No. 3106-KO dated November 20, 1980) is being distributed separately.
Supplementary project data are provided in Annex III. Negotiations were held
in Washington from October 20 to October 27, 1980,with a Korean delegation led
by by Mr. Myung Hyun Sohn, Deputy Director General of the Economic Cooperation
Bureau of the Economic Planning Board.
The Korean Development Bank
51. Scope of Operations. KDB was established in 1954 to help in the
postwar rehabilitation of industry and to finance economic development.
KDB is the single largest financial institution in Korea and plays a leading
role in providing term finance for industry. KDB has achieved an impressive
growth of nearly 50% p.a. in its loan portfolio over the past two years and
it stands out as a well-managed and efficient institution. At end-1979, KDB
had a total staff of 1,960 organized into 21 departments, 10 regional
branches and 7 overseas representative offices. At end-1979, its total
assets reached $13.7 billion (including loan guarantees of $7.7 billion) and
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accounted for 14.2% of the total assets of the financial sector. In 1979,
KDB-s loan commitments totalled $2.0 billion and loan guarantees $2.4
billion. KDB administers solely or jointly with other financial
institutions all the major industrial financing programs sponsored and
funded by the Government. In addition to industry, KDB supports major
projects in the transportation and power sectors. KDB's lending to the
private sector accounts for an increasing share of its loan portfolio (52%
on an outstanding basis at end-1979).
52. KDB provides its clientele with a comprehensive range of financial
services including domestic and foreign currency lending for equipment
purchases; working capital; equity participation; issuance of loan
guarantees; and general foreign exchange business (letters of credit). KDB
is most active in equipment financing both directly through its lending
operations and indirectly through issuance of guarantees to other lenders
inside and outside Korea. Working capital loans accounted for 17.5% of KDB's
aggregate commitments in 1976-79. Foreign currency operations accounted for
just over 20% of KDB's loan commitments in 1978-79.
53. KDB's Developmental Impact. KDB has an impressive record in
(a) transferring financial resources to the vitally important industrial
sector; (b) building up its institutional capability as a development bank;
and (c) deepening the structure of the financial sector in Korea.
54. KDB-s loan disbursements have grown at an average annual rate of
61% over the three-year period 1977-79 and reached $1.94 billion equivalent
in 1979, or about 18% of total fixed investment in industry, power and
transportation. KDB contributed 31.7% of the increase in term lending to the
manufacturing sector over 1976-79 making it the single largest source of term
finance for industry in Korea. Although foreign currency loans accounted for
only 15% of KDB's portfolio at end-1979, it is the most important source of
foreign exchange resources for industry. In 1979, KDB accounted for 29% of
the foreign currency loans (by amount) to the manufacturing sector.
As of December 31, 1979, KDB clients employed a total of 1 million persons,
80% in the manufacturing sector. The average cost per job for subprojects
under the most recent Bank Loan was about $35,000 and reflects KDB's
primary role as a promoter of large projects in the priority sectors of
power, shipbuilding, basic metals and machinery.
55. The institutional capability of KDB has improved markedly over the
past five years. This is reflected in the quality of KDB's appraisal and
supervision work as well as the soundness of its policies and procedures.
KDB's appraisal standards and procedures are quite satisfactory for all
projects funded from its own resources including foreign currency resources
from official lenders (ADB, IBRD, et.al.). Because of government intervention
in allocative decisions, KDB's input in the appraisal of projects funded with
government resources tends to be less extensive. In cases where Government
resources are not involved, increasing emphasis has been placed by KDB in
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recent years on detailed economic analysis (including ERR calculations) and
on the employment impact of projects. KDB is well equipped to carry out
thorough economic and industrial research work having a large and competent
research unit. KDB's project supervision is thorough and effective as
reflected in the good quality of its portfolio.
56. KDB's procurement and disbursement practices are sound. ADB and
the Bank have helped KDB strengthen its procedures. Procurement methods now
emphasize International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and limited competitive
bidding for smaller contracts (less than US$1 million equivalent). ICB is
the most frequent form of procurement and it accounted for 56% of all
procurement contracts under the previous Bank loan (Loan 1574-KO) to KDB.
57. KDB's operational policies are guided by a Policy Statement
adopted in 1975. In addition to the general policy guidelines provided in
this document, KDB adopted, in 1978, the practice of formulating, in
consultation with the Bank, strategy statements highlighting its short-run
developmental objectives over a two-year period. These objectives focus on
KDB's efficiency in resource mobilization and allocation as well as its
developmental activities in the industrial and financial sectors.
58. Another measure of KDB's importance as a development institution
is the impact achieved in developing and deepening the structure of the Korean
financial system by sponsoring the establishment of several specialized
financial institutions. Since 1973, KDB has helped establish a leasing
company, two merchant banks and two overseas investment banks. These
companies were established as joint ventures with other Korean and/or foreign
financial institutions. KDB has used part of the previous Bank loans to
finance the operation of its leasing subsidiary.
59. Resource Allocation. The mere size of KDB's loan disbursements of
nearly $2 billion in 1979 is an indicator of the importance of its per-
formance in resource allocation. KDB's operations have provided direct
support to the Government's industrial development strategy. Its lending has
been directed primarily toward the priority areas of manufacturing, power and
transportation, which accounted, respectively, for 50%, 25% and 17% of its
outstanding loan portfolio at end-1979. Within manufacturing, heavy and
chemical industries accounted for 77%. The Government exerts its influence
on KDB by issuing directives related to particular allocative decisions.
Government directives are most commonly exercised for operations funded with
either budgetary resources or under specialized programs such as NIF. These
two types of government-funded operations accounted respectively for 12.6% and
41.7% of KDB's loan portfolio at end1979. Government intervention in
allocative decisions ranges from the determination of broad sectoral lending
targets to allocation by term, by currency and, at times, by individual firms.
In all, approximately 75% of KDB's lending operations are subject to some
degree of government direction. Thus, KDB acts, at times, as a mere channel
of Governmental funds. The Government concedes that in such instances, KDB
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does not subject the schemes in question to its normal procedures of scrutiny
in order to establish their financial and economic viability. Accordingly,
the Government agreed to relieve KDB of the financial risks associated with
most of the lending operations undertaken at the former's behest at the time
the Bank's first loan (Loan No. 1095-KG) to KDB was made in March 1975.
At the same time, there is scope for enhancing the role and responsibilities
of KDB in helping determine sectoral priorities and fund allocation under
the Government-sponsored program of directed/subsidized lending. This has
been dealt with in the policy undertakings described in para. 45 above.
60. KDB is expected to allocate the resources it raises independently
in accordance with the priorities defined in the 1953 Act which established
KDB. These include power, coal mining, shipbuilding, iron and steel,
semiconductors, marine and air transportation. In this instance,
project-by-project allocation is determined independently by KDB within
sectoral targets fixed annually in consultation with the Ministry of Finance.
Foreign borrowings from official institutions (IBRD, ADB, et.al.) are immune
from government directives.
61. The quality of KDB's portfolio is satisfactory. At the end of 1979,
companies operating profitably accounted for about 90% of the loan portfolio.
Arrears amounted to only 7% of the outstanding portfolio; and arrears over
three months accounted for no more than 0.5%.
62. Resource Mobilization. KDB's performance in mobilizing resources
through direct borrowings and, indirectly, through the issuance of loan
guarantees has been most impressive, particularly in the past four years.
KDB's outstanding liabilities (excluding guarantees) have grown at an average
of 48% p.a. over 1977-79 and reached the equivalent of $4.64 billion at
end-1979. Foreign currency borrowings, particularly from commercial sources,
have grown very rapidly and have brought about a reduction in the share of
domestic currency borrowings from 75.1% of total borrowings in 1975 to 64.3%
in 1979.
63. Budgetary appropriations and special government funds (including
NIF) provide the bulk of KDB's domestic currency resources. Their combined
share has increased from 77% of KDB's total domestic currency borrowings in
1975 to 83% in 1979, due to the slower growth of KDB's other domestic
currency resources, i.e., deposits and debentures. The domestic currency
resources raised by KDB independently from the Government consist almost
exclusively of debentures issued with a maturity of one to five years.
Issuance of debentures is encouraged by the Government as a means of
increasing KDB's resources and of lengthening maturities in the securities
market. Although KDB has been raising increasing amounts of funds through
debenture issues, their share in KDB's total domestic currency resources has
been declining from 16.6% in 1975 to 9.9% in 1979. KDB's limited success in
issuing debcntures is due to the fact that the onlending of debenture proceeds
gives KDB a negative interest spread of about two percentage points. The
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agreement reached during negotiations (para. 46 above) to allow KDB to charge
a rate which would allow for a positive spread on its debentures proceeds
should alleviate this problem.
64. KDB has been extremely successful at mobilizing increasing amounts
of foreign currency resources, particularly from the international market.
Over the period 1975-79, KDB has mobilized a total of $1.68 billion of which
23% was supplied by official sources (ADB, IBRD and KfW). KDB'S reliance on
foreign official borrowings, which reached 75% of total foreign borrowings
over 1966-73, declined to 23% over 1975-79. A further reduction is expected
in the coming years.
65. KDB has experienced a shortage of domestic currency resources over
the last decade. Over 1975-79, its outstanding domestic currency loans have
increased by only W 1.15 billion ($2.37 billion) while outstanding domestic
currency borrowings increased by W 850 billion ($1.75 billion). At end-1979,
outstanding domestic currency loans reached W 1,815 billion ($3.7 billion)
compared to outstanding domestic currency borrowings of W 1,447 billion ($3.0
billion). This resource gap has been covered through the conversion of a part
of KDB's foreign commercial borrowings into domestic currency. Despite the
foreign exchange risk involved (which is passed on to the subborrowers), the
cost of these funds to KDB and to the subborrowers has been much lower
than alternative domestic currency resources such as debentures.
66. The conversion by KDB of part of its foreign commercial borrowings
into domestic currency through deposits at the BOK has also provided effective
support to Korea's balance of payments. In view of the sizeable deficit of
the balance of payments in 1979, the Government has requested KDB to provide
more direct support by depositing with BOK a part of its "jumbo" $600 million
commercial loan which KDB raised that year. This new mandate given to KDB
(and the Korea Exchange Bank) by the Government, effectively makes it a
borrowing agent for the Korean Government in international capital markets.
67. Financial Projections and Resource Requirements. KDB's business and
financial forecasts in connection with the proposed loan are based on very
conservative assumptions. Its volume of operations, despite the present
slow down of industrial activity, is likely to be restricted by resource
considerations rather than any lack of demand for KDB's assistance. Loan
commitments are projected to expand at a rate of 14% p.a. over 1981-83
(compared to a historical rate of 47% over 1976-79) and equity investments at
21% p.a. Foreign currency lending operations would remain at about 20% of
total loan commitments, the level reached in 1979. KDB-s total assets are
expected to grow at 24% p.a., and to reach $11.9 billion in 1983. The
long-term debt/equity ratio would remain within the contractual limit of 10:1
throughout the projection period.
68. As in the past, the actual level of KDB-s operations would depend
upon resource availability. Over 1980-83, KDB plans to raise a total of
W 4.8 billion ($8.2 billion), of which 37% would be in foreign currency.
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Official sources of funds, including the proposed Bank loan, would provide
8.5% of total foreign currency borrowings of $3.1 billion. The proposed $100
million loan would cover about 10% of KDB's projected foreign currency
commitments ($987 million) over 1981-82. Despite the conservativeness of its
business forecasts, KDB would need to borrow heavily from both the Government
($3.3 billion equivalent) and from foreign commercial sources ($2.8 billion)
to support its operations over 1980-83. The high priority accorded by the
Government to revive industrial growth and KDB's excellent credit standing in
the international capital market indicate that it will be able to secure
these resources without undue difficulty.
69. KDB's reliance on official borrowings has declined markedly in
recent years because of its success in mobilizing foreign currency resources
from commercial sources. A complete phasing out of KDB's reliance on
official borrowings does not seem feasible nor desirable in the near future.
Only official borrowings have a maturity which is long enough to meet the
requirements of many of the skill and technology intensive projects which KDB
finances. The maturity of KDB's other resources, domestic or foreign is too
short for this purpose.
Main Features of the Loan
70. As with previous Bank loans to KDB, the proposed loan would be
used to finance (a) 100% of the foreign exchange cost of directly imported
goods and services and (b) 60% of the cost in domestic currency (represent-
ing the estimated foreign exchange component) of locally manufactured or
procured machinery and equipment (Section 2.02(a) of the Loan Agreement).
Procurement would be in accordance with KDB's standard procedures which are
satisfactory. The long-term debt/equity limit agreed with KDB which was
raised to 10:1 in July 1979 is adequate and would be maintained (Section 4.06
of the Loan Agreement). In view of the very satisfactory standard of KDB's
appraisal work, it is recommended that the free limit on individual subloans
which was set at $2.5 million under the previous Bank loan be raised to
$5 million (Section 2.02(a) of the Loan Agreement). It is estimated that the
proposed free limit of $5 million will result in approximately 40% of the
proposed loan being allocated to subprojects requiring detailed review by the
Bank prior to approval. A subloan ceiling of $10 million is recommended
under the proposed loan (compared to $7.5 million under the previous loan) in
view of the size of some of the heavy industry projects financed by KDB
(Section 2.02(a) of the Loan Agreement).
Terms and Conditions of Subloans
71. The proposed loan would have an adjustable composite amortization
schedule reflecting the aggregate amortization schedules of the subloans made
by KDB. The loan is expected to be fully repaid within 15 years including a
grace period of three years. Individual subloans would have a maximum
maturity of 13 years including a normal grace period of 3 years, except in
cases described below. In order to encourage increased mobilization of
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medium-term foreign commercial borrowings by KDB, the Bank would allow some
of the subloans to be funded with a mix of Bank and commercial resources. In
such cases, the amortization schedules of the subloans would permit earlier
repayment of commercial funds with the proceeds of the Bank loan being
covered under later maturities. A grace period of up to five years would be
accepted in such cases. KDB would relend the loan proceeds at an interest
rate of two percentage points over the weighted average cost of available
foreign official resources with the subborrowers assuming the foreign
exchange risk. This is likely to result in a relending rate of about 11%.
The 2% interest spread is more than adequate for KDB to cover the
administrative costs incurred in processing its foreign exchange loans. Over
the period 1972-80, the average depreciation of the Won vis-a-vis the US
dollar has added a cost of about 6.5% p.a. to the cost of Bank funds.
Furthermore, the Bank's practice of disbursing a mix of dollars and other
foreign currencies has added an average cost of 5.3% p.a. to previous Bank
loans, depending on the share of "hard" currencies. Even with the
introduction of the currency pooling system (assuming that past trends in
foreign exchange fluctuations remain unchanged) the lending rate of Bank
funds is expected to reach an effective level of over 20% p.a. in Won terms
which is slightly higher than the 19% rate applicable to most domestic
currency loans in Korea. These rates are above the long-term inflation rate
in Korea which was approximately 15% per annum during the period 1970-79.
KDB's onlending rate is below the inflation level which has obtained so far
in 1980 (the Wholesale Price Index is expected to rise by 40%). However,
the Government has adopted a series of measures to contain inflation. If,
as is expected, the rate of price increase returns to near the historical
levels, KDB's onlending rates for both domestic and foreign currency would
be positive in real terms.
Benefits and Risks
72. The continued expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector
remains a key objective of the Government's development strategy. KDB's role
is crucial within the Korean financial system and its performance to date has
been highly satisfactory from both the developmental and institutional stand-
points. KDB is a particularly suitable intermediary for allocating resources
for the development of the industrial sector. The Bank's association with
KDB has proved to be a productive and beneficial one. Through KDB, Bank
resources totalling $226.7 million (as of July 31, 1980) have been committed
to over 200 economically and financially viable projects in the manufactur-
ing, mining, infrastructure and transport sectors. The Bank has been
successful in helping KDB improve its institutional capabilities and enhance
the developmental impact of its operations.
73. Transfer of resources to industry and further progress of KDB from
the institutional and developmental standpoints remain major objectives of
the proposed loan. To the extent that DFC projects are quick disbursing,
the loan would also contribute to meeting the heavy balance of payments
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deficits expected over the next few years. The proposed loan is also expected
to have a beneficial impact on the financial sector as a whole through the
adoption of policy measures which were discussed with the Government at
negotiations.
74. The proposed loan would assist worthwhile projects in the
industrial sector. Experience with previous Bank loans to KDB shows that the
projects financed with Bank resources were generally heavily export oriented
and yielded substantial economic benefits to the country. Calculations of
economic rates of return showed a range of 13% to 46%. The subprojects to be
financed under the proposed loan, although not yet identified, are expected to
yield similar economic benefits. There are no significant risks associated
with the implementation of the project. Although the full impact of the
financial sector reforms cannot be fully assessed in advance, these reforms
are expected to have significantly positive effects on resource allocation
and on investment efficiency. These effects will be monitored closely by
Bank staff.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY
75. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and the Korea Develop-
ment Bank, the draft Guarantee Agreement between the Republic of Korea and
the Bank, a draft Supplemental Letter to the Guarantee Agreement (entitled
"Financial Sector Policy Improvements"), and the report of the Committee
provided for in Article III, Section 4(iii) of the Articles of Agreement of
the Bank are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately.
Special conditions of the loan are listed in Section III of Annex III.
PART VI - RECOMMENDATION
76. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Robert S. McNamara
President
by: Moeen A. Qureshi
Attachments
December 1, 1980
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KOREA REPUBLIC OF - SOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SHEET
KOREA REPUBLIC OF REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES
LAND AREA (THOUSAND SQ. M. - MOST RECENT ESTI aTE
TOTAL 98.5
AGRICULTURAL 22.7 MOST RECENT MIDDLE INCOME MIDDLE INCOME
1960 /b 1970 /b ESTIMATE /b ASIA 4 PACIFIC LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
GNP PER CAPITA (US$) 160.0 380.0 1160.0 894.8 1384.1
ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA
(KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVALENT) 258.0 815.0 1359.0 842.4 1055.9
POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS
POPULATION, MID-YEAR (MILLIONS) 24.7 31.4 36.6
URBAN POPULATION (PERCENT OF TOTAL) 27.7 40.7 52.1 39.1 63.4
POPULATION PROJECTIONS
POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (MILLIONS) 50.0
STATIONARY POPULATION (MILLIONS) 66.0
YEAR STATIONARY POPULATION IS REACHED 2070
POPULATION DENSITY
PER SQ. KM. 251.0 319.0 372.0 376. 1 28.1
PER SQ. EM. AGRICULTURAL LAND 1154.0 1371.0 1612.0 2350.4 81.7
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE (PERCENT)
0-14 YRS. 42.9 41.0 35.9 40.4 41.4
15-64 YRS. 53.8 55.7 60.3 56.2 54.7
65 YRS. AND ABOVE 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.9
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (PERCENT)
TOTAL 1.9 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.7
URBAN 5.9 6.5 5.2 4.1 4.1
CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUSAND) 41.0 30.0 21.0 28.7 34.8
CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND) 13.0 10.0 8.0 7.9 8.9
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE 3.1/c 2.6 1.4 1.9 2.5
FAMILY PLANNING
ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUSANDS) .. 672.0 686.0
USERS (PERCENT OF MARRIED WOMEN) .. 42.0 43.9 39.0
FOOD AND NUTRITION
INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION
PER CAPITA (1969-71-100) 89.0 99.0 115.0 116.9 106.9
PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF
CALORIES (PERCENT OF
REQUIREMENTS) 94.0 110.0 119.0 108.9 107.4
PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY) 55.0 65.0 73.0 60.3 65.6
OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE 7.0 8.0 15.0 18.8 33.7
CHILD (AGES 1-4) MORTALITY RATE 13.0 8.0 5.0 5.3 8.4
HEALTH
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS) 54.0 59.0 63.0 63.0 63.1
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER
THOUSAND) 62.0 43.0 37.0 52.8 66.5
ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (PERCENT OF
POPULATION)
TOTAL .. 58.0 62.0 42.4 65.9
BRBAN .. 84.0 80.0 62.1 80.4
RURAL .. 38.0 36.0 29.7 44.0
ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (PERCENT
OF POPULATION)
TOTAL .. 25.0 61.0 52.8 62.3
URBAN .. 59.0 68.0 71.1 79.4
RURAL .. .. 50.0 42.4 29.6
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN 3000.0 2110.0 1955.0 4120.1 1849.2
POPlULATION PER NURSING PERSON 3220.0/d 2170.0/d 510.0 2213.6 1227.5
POPULATION PER HOSPITAL BED
TOTAL 2482.0 1900.0 1569.0 819.4 480.3
URBAN .. ..
RURAL .. ..
ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BFD .. 14.9 .. 28.8
SOPS ING
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
TOTAL. 5.6 5.3 5. 1
URBAN 5.4 5.0 4.9
RURAL 5.6 5.5 5.3
AVERAGE NUM3ER OF PERSONS PER ROOM
TOTAL 2.5 2.3 2.0
URBAN 2.8 2.7 2. 1
RURAL 2.4 2.2 2.0
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (PERCENT
OF DWELLINGS)
TOTAL 28.0 49.9 ..
URBAN 67.3 92.4 ..
RURAL 12.0 29.9 64.9
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KOREA REPUBLIC OF - SOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SHEET
KOREA REPUBLIC OF REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVEAGES
- MOST RECENT ESTIMATE
MOST RECENT MIDDLE INCOME MIDDLE INCOME
1960 /b 1970 /b ESTIMATE /b ASIA & PACIFIC LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
EDUCATION
ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS
PRIMARY: TOTAL 94.0 105.0 111.0 98.6 99.7
MALE 99.0 106.0 111.0 99.2 101.0
FEMALE 89.0 105.0 111.0 97.7 99.4
SECONDARY: TOTAL 27.0 43.0 88.0 55.5 34.4
MALE 38.0 52.0 96.0 60.7 33.5
FEMALE 14.0 34.0 78.0 49.9 34.7
VOCATIONAL ENROL. (7 OF SECONDARY) 14.0 16.0 16.0 13.7 38.2
PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO
PRIMARY 58.0 57.0 49.0 34.6 30.5
SECONDARY 34.0 37.0 38.0 28.5 14.5
ADULT LITERACY RATE (PERCENT) 70.6 87.0 93.0 85.8 76.3
CONSUMPTION
PASSENGER CARS PER THOUSAND
POPULATION 0.4 2.0 3.5 9.0 43.0
RADIO RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND
POPULATION 32.0 131.0 144.0 118.9 245.3
TV RECEIVERS PER THOUSAND
POPULATION 0.3 14.0 66.0 39.4 84.2
NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL
INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER
THOUSAND POPULATION 69.0 138.0 173.0 .. 63.3
CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE PER CAPITA 4.0 5.0 2.2 4.9
LABOR FORCE
TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUSANDS) 8237.0 10978.3 13767.4
FEMALE (PERCENT) 25.8 32.7 33.0 36.8 22.2
AGRICULTURE (PERCENT) 66.4 51.0 41.0 51.9 37.1
INDUSTRY (PERCENT) 9.3 20.1 37.0 21. 9 23.5
PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT)
TOTAL 33.4 35.0 36.6 39.1 31.5
MIALE 49.5 46.8 48.8 48.5 48.9
FEMALE 17.2 23.0 24.2 29.6 14.0
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.4
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME
RECEIVED BY
HIGHEST 5 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS 15.1/e 17.1 16.1
HIGHEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS 42.3/e 44.5 45.3
LOWEST 20 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS 5.7/e 7.1 5.7
LOWEST 40 PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS 19.0/e 17.7 16.9
POVERTY TARGET GROUPS
ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME
LEVEL (US$ PER CAPITA)
URBAN .. .. 320.0
RURAL .. .. 270.0 192.1 190.8
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME
LEVEL (US$ PER CAPITA)
URBAN .. .. 270.0L .. 474.0
RURAL .. .. 227.01f 182.5 332.5
ESTIMATED POPULATION BELOW ABSOLUTE
POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (PERCENT)
URBAN .. .. 18.0
RUFAL .. .. 11.0 33.2
Not available
Not applicable.
NOTES
/a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries
among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform.
/b Unless otherwise noted, data for 1960 refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; for 1970. between 1969
and 1971; and for Most Recent Estimate, between 1974 and 1978.
/c 1950-55; /d Registered, not all practicing in the country; /e 1965., If Recent estimates are $370 and
5310 respectively.
April, 1980
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DErFINITIOII OF SOCIAL INDICATORS
Note.: Although the data ate drow frog sucs-genralydjudged the most euthatitetiv and reliable, it ehoald elno be noted that they map not he inte-
notcnoallyoomp...ahln because of the look of tcondarditad dfinitrio and to....Pt. used by different -ootunci incolccr the data. The dot rear,no-
rhel1e .. ne..ful to dosoribe otdsre of magnitude, indioete tende, and charotariew certain major dif f.rercee betwe.n cotrire.
The rfatrenn. groope or (1) the wa- Country groop of the objet routry and (2) A country group with somehat high-e -oveag inome than the o_aney gropof thr subjeti coutrY (ent..Pt ar "CaPital Ourplue Oil nportere" group where 'Middle In-m North Afrioe und Middle tact toi chosen hoca.em of srne
... oio-cultorAI fffininia). In tha refernc grop data the aver.ages sa population weighted arithmetic mna for ...ch indicator end show only when enIe.. haf of the Conanries in A grupha date fu ht indicator. Sinc. the --erga of -tonriae emog the indicators depends on the -oilebility ofdatXad so -mifcrm, oetion mut hbonecier inr ting avrgs. of one indiretor t anther. Three -vrgs era only ...efl in comparing the value
of one indicator at A tiea amon the coutryadrfrec 
_gope..
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ECONOMItC DEVELOPMENT DATA SHEET
Actual /e Pro-ected Gr-wth raLte (1)
1965 1970 1917 1973 1974 1975 1916 1977 1917 1979 19bO 1965-75 1978 1978-80
A. N.t,loal Ac--oanr,
(tillIl on US$ at
1975 prices)
1. CGP 6,939.3 11,760.4 13.852.7 16,127.4 17,542.2 19,089. 22L,947.8 25, 769.0 28,688.0 31,324.0 33,938.0 10.7 LL.3 8.7
2. Galns fro. TOt 140.4 665.3 1,122.9 1,486.4 348.7 - 1,160.5 1,511.0 [.685.0 1,350.0 1,337.0 - - -
3. Gross domestic
fncore 7,079.7 12,425.7 14,975.6 17.613.7 17,890.9 19,089.2 23,108.4 27,280.0 30,373.0 32,674.0 35,275.0 10.4 11.3 7.7
4. Invportg (goodn
and NFS) 964.3 4,228.6 5,273.4 7,154.3 7,373.4 7,464.0 9,680.0 11,723.0 15,138.0 16,077.0 16,ho36.0 22.5 29.1 4.9
5. Exports volume 388.3 1,843.8 3,111.5 5,001.9 4,887.9 5,678.6 8,129.6 10.210.0 11,994.0 12,294.0 12,827.0 30.7 17.5 3.4
6. ExportS
(adjusted
for TOT) 528.7 2,509.1 4,234.3 6,488.3 5,236.6 5,678.6 9,290.1 11,721.0 13,978.0 13,644.0 14,164.0 26.1 19.2 0.6
7. Resour-e gap
(adjusted
for TOTI 455.6 1,719.5 1,039.0 666.0 2,136.8 1,785.4 389.9 2.0 1.160.0 2,433.0 2,472.0 - - -
S. Total
consumption 6,873.1 10.771.0 12,686.9 13,617.4 14,525.2 15,381.1 16.538.4 19,187.0 21,299.0 23,006.0 24,616.0 8.3 11.0 7.5
9. lnvesto,ent 917.1 3,Z76.1 3,105.5 4,275.9 5,070.2 5,120.6 5,874.4 7,975.0 1O,841.0 11,900.0 12,852.0 18.8 35.9 8.8
10. Dooestic savings
(adjust.d for
TOT) 206.6 1,654.8 2,288.7 3,996.3 3,365.7 3,708.1 6,569.9 8,093.0 9,373.0 9,668.0 10,659.0 33.6 15.8 7.4
CD. G P at current
US$ 2,996.5 8,303.4 9,835.8 12,393.1 16,780.1 19,089.2 25,369.5 35,375.0 47,582.0 60,488.0 72,633.0 20.7 34.5 23.9
8. Sector Output
(Share of GDP at
1975 prices)
1. Aariculturt,
forestry
and fish4ci.s 46.3 32.8 29.3 26.1 25.3 24.9 23.6 22.2 19.1 19.6 19.1 - - -
2. P1miig and
anufacturing 13.9 20.5 23.4 26.2 28.2 29.2 31.8 30.6 32.9 31.9 32.0 - - -
3. Other 39.8 46.7 47.4 47.8 46.5 45.9 44.5 47.2 48.0 48.5 48.9 - - -
C. Prices (1975-100)
1. Export price
index /a 57.7 67.4 67.3 85.2 107.9 100.0 111.7 120.7 132.9 154.1 167.7 - - -
2. Iqport price
index /a 46.3 46.2 46.8 62.5 97.2 100.0 98.0 105.2 114.0 138.8 151.9 - - -
3. Terms of trade
index 124.6 145.9 143.8 136.3 111.0 100.0 114.0 114.8 116.5 111.0 110.4 - - -
4. GD? deflator 43.2 70.6 71.0 76.8 95.7 100.0 115.6 137.3 165.9 193.1 214.0 - - -
5. Average e.c6ange
rate 266.2 310.4 394.0 398.5 406.0 484.0 484.0 484.0 484.0 484.0 484.0 - - -
D. Sele-ted todicators 1965-75 1977-80 E. Actoal
1. ICUO 2.39 3.75 196C 1970 1975 1977 1978
2. tc.ort elasti,ity 2.10 1.08 1. Labor force (million) 8.9 10.2 12.3 13.4 13.9
3. Average dosestic 2. Unemployment (: of E.1) 7.9 4.9 4.1 3.8 3.2
savings rate 0.15 0.31 3. E2ployment (million) 8.2 9.7 11.8 12.9 13.5
4. Marginal domestic (1 shares) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
savings rate 0.29 0.25 3.1 Agriculture, forestry,
5. Itport./GDP 0.36 0.49 fisheries 58.6 50.5 45.9 41.8 38.4
6. Gnv.sctee-t/GDP 0.25 0.36 3.2 4ining and n-facturing 10.4 14.3 19.1 22.4 28.5
7. Resource gap/GDY 0.11 0.05 3.3 Other 31.0 35.2 35.0 35.8 33.1
F. Public Finance /b 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977/d
(Z of GDP)
1. Current revenue L7.8 16.9 18.3 20.3 22.9 22.7
1.1 Tax rev-nue 13.5 13.2 15.0 16.8 18.9 18.9
2. Current
espendiLur. 14.2 11.6 12.4 14.4 14.3 15.7
2.1 Defes..
expenditures 4.5 3.7 4.4 4.8 5.7 6.3
3. Governoeet
saving 3.5 5.3 5.0 5.8 8.5 7.0
6. Capltal
expenditur. /C 11.3 8.7 8.0 8.3 12.7 10.5
/ Data for 1965-76 rofer to -erchandis- trade only, 1977-80 data incldde nrh-andtse sod nonfactor ervci
b efer- to the G.ovr-mer S-ctor, co-prlslig Central Goverunent (incl.di.g gooerne-t -nterpri ... ), Loal Government and SpecIal Accounts.
/c Refers to total Apitol e-p-adlturen. les- repy-ent of debts.
/e 8udget -ntiates.
J. Data Lor 1977 old 1978 *re based an revised Natot.al Accounts (0tK, August 1979); detIl1s of the revised historical series for 1965-76 were not
Available at thls t-.
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ALN,OfPAY7tFS'TS AND tXTENA7I,7 ASSIOTANCt
(0tIlio at current prlcce)
A,t.ual1 Prlolcte
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1974 1917 1978 1979 L980
A. Suanare of UL,ne. of Payme-to
1. Exports (Inc.. NFS1 998 1.221 1,478 2,073 3.962 5.125 5,679 9.111 12,328 I5.940 18,942 21.312
2. Imports (IncL. NFS) 1.880 2.064 2,490 2.377 4,368 7.209 74664 9,492 12,329 17,264 22.321 23,267
3. Resource balance -882 -843 -1,012 -302 -406 -2.084 -1.785 -382 -1 -1.324 -3,379 -3.755
4. NotE f.ctor sarvice income
(1) Not iLter.st payments 2 -29 -91 -138 -166 -229 -399 -411 -479 -702 -790 -997
of which Interest on public MILT loans -47 -68 -09 -120 -150 -201 -290 -345 -437 -633 -1.065 -1 .374
(2) Direct Investment Income -6 -8 - -2 I -8 - -37 .63 -80 -65 -46
(3) Wlorkers' remittances (net) Yj- - - - - - - - -
(4) Other factor mervIce inCome (net) 91 77 84 101 72 74 76 167 332 349 787 916
5. Current transfers (net) 246 180 171 170 190 224 226 349 223 472 300 600
6. Blanece on correct -cicent -54 -623 -840 -37Lk -309 -2.023 -1.88 -314 12 -1 .085 -j,947 -3.282
7. PrIvate airect Lnveetment 6 6c3 7 137 104 53 76 104 101 110 123
8. Official capital grarto 1S0 131 84 87 61 64 - - - - - -
Peblit 9 6 LT Lon-
9. Dimbirsemnets 660 414 625 735 757 1.155 1.687 1.701 2,212 3.919 4.965 5,275
10. Amortieatlon 109 205 215 289 334 391 368 494 720 L.142 1.500 1.700
LI. Net oLob.rsemonts 551 209 410 446 423 764 1.319 1,207 1,492 2,777 3,465 3.575
Other N 6 LT! L.ois
12. Disbursements 17 78 33 49 71 114 85 115 46 - - -
13. A.orti&.tloo 3 8 10 L0 LS 23 20 103 71 97 75 72
14. Net disbursements 34 70 23 39 36 151 57 10 -25 -97 -75 -72
13. Use of IKfF res.uren.8lb - -10 -8 -10 - 132 130 97 -25 -2 - -
16. Short-tar. capital tr.nsactLo.s 57 122 133 -19 82 -45 660 357 21 -1,171 400 500
1 7. Capital traneectioo 49E1 / -78 71 112 -87 -110 868 141 -14 -233 108 70 154
LB. Chaoge in rseerves (- - incranece /l ~ 161 -35 49 -139 -340 -15 -493 -1.419 -1.346 -631 -1,023 -1.000
19. ForeIgn e"change reservee It (end of period) 549 584 335 694 1.034 1.049 1.342 2.961 4.307 6,938 5.961 6,961
8. Grant end Loan COmitnentB
1. Official grant I5O 131 86 87 61 64 - - - -
2. Total p.blic M & LT lnane 753 475 689 813 1.073 1,972 1.304 3.613 3,304 5.014
(1) EnRD 65 40 85 73 150 83 382.5 372 335 659
(2) IDA LS LS 7 26 20 --- - -
(3) Other -.Ltilltera1 Lf 25 20 81 68 46 89 101.5 114 133 30
(4) G-n .oernant A& 102 161 253 479 383 477 360 917 406 1.190
Of which centrally plaonne mc.onoics - - - - - - - - - -
(5) Soppliers 374 L34 248 94 223 486 232 689 3.144 1.027
(6) Financial institutions 144 104 13 73 240 737 193 1.448 1.216 1.966
17) B-de a - L- 19 - 60 68s L22
18) Public loans NEI /h 28 - - 11 79 34 - - -
3. Other N & i.T Loane Li. lOG 26 67 74 213 120 138 97 16 
Detbt and Debt Services
Public debt nutnt.nd ng & diob.-ed (end fparied) 2.691 3,199 3.982 5.277 6.659 8.472 1L.992
Interest on public doOt 120 150 201 290 389 437 653
lapeysente on Public dent 289 334 391 368 504 717 1.142
Total public debt service 409 484 592 658 893 1.154 3,795
Other debt service (nOit) 23 33 54 60 103 125 140
Total debt sarvice (not) 432 317 646 738 996 1,279 1.935
Surden no Export Earnings (2)
P.bliC debt 9-rLce 19.7 12.2 11.6 11.6 9.8 9.2 31.3
Total debt 9ervic. 20.8 13.1 12.6 12.6 10.9 30.2 12.1
TOS + Direct lnveot. Inc. 20.7 13.1 12.4 12.6 11.3 10.7 12.6
A-r.rac Tr.- en Public Dent
Interest ae I prior year DO40 5.3 3.6 6.3 7.6 8.2 7.3 7.7
Amortization - I prior year 004D 32.9 12.4 12.2 9.2 10.9 11.9 13.5
lBRD debt .. t.c... L.9 & dtOb.r..d 94.7 139.8 223.8 403.5 659.0 835.1 1,123.2
0880D as 2 public debt 042 3.5 6.4 5.6 7.7 9.9 9.9 9.4
080D .0 em public dent ner-ice 1.7 2.5 3.3 4.9 5.7 6.7 6.4
IDlA debt miitetading &di.b.r.ed 47.1 58.3 78.3 92.7 102.4 111.1 114.4
IDA, am I public debt eer'Oe 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.0
IDA .0 X p.bli. debt ser~~~~~~ic 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 6.1I
Zet.rna1 Debt (Die nurnd only) O.tet.ndi.g Decenn,r 31. 1918 Aer-t I
1. I8RD T.l23.2 9.4
2. Bank Group Li. 1.237.5 10.3
3. Other - Itilat.ra1 400.9 3.3
4. Government 3,353.9 28.0
Of ehich centrally planned edeco- -
5. Suppliers 3.711.5 31.0
6. Finan.cial lnatictoione 3,021.4 25.2
7. lend. 266.2 2.2
8. Other public debt n,..- -
9. Total public dent IL.99t.6 300.0
10. Other M0.T debt 461.2
It. Total p.blIc add ether MLT dent (dleb.r-d) 12,452.8
12. Total p.blIc end ether MLT dent (t-l. cndlsb.rood) 19.080.7
C. Memorseden It-,
3. Grant ne-ci ef etotl -meitsent. 25.2 25.8 30.5 37.2 25,2 27.7 10.6 11.1 8.0 7.4
2. Aenrog. Intereat (t) 5. 1 5.1L 5.2 4.8 6.1 0.0 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.8
3. A-er.je mterity (yearn) 14.1 17.9 19.0 23.6 18. 3 11.6 13.0 13.0 11.4 14.4
Li Includod Ln ether factr. oe-tl- incone.
LbNet of `dreutluge- e-d repaYmen oy purch.an ~iFS).
/. Incledoe b07 c--ng~ ryI tile oank ing ... ot-
/d n. lod - -t e,f IMF ...so r-se nhich are ebh." enperate1y.
/. ,rnt1,11benVe (IFS).
LA eldoh bllt-ruic"A. Fxi.0l.h. off,icil exp-r urcaita. including US CUC Credite.
Li. Prlo-te on
Li LExcludes [FL:.
Noveber 29. 1979
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KOREA
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as of July 31, 1980)
Loan or Amount ($ million)
Credit Calendar (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank TW IDA Undisbursed
Twenty loans and eight credits fully disbursed 725.67 40.0 106.81
906 1973 Republic of Korea Education II 23.0 0.35
917 1973 Republic of Korea Ports I 80.0 0.41
953 1974 Republic of Korea Tourism 25.0 0.16
994 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 0.04
1070 1975 Republic of Korea Secondary Cities-Gwangju 15.0 1.85
1096 1975 Republic of Korea Education III 22.5 2.93
1101 1975 Republic of Korea Railways V 100.0 0.36
1193 1976 Republic of Korea Second Integrated Dairy Dev. 15.0 0.01
1203 1976 Republic of Korea Highways III 90.0 2.32
1319 1976 ADC Irrigation 29.0 23.65
1338 1976 KDB II Dev. Finance Co. 75.0 1.96
1364 1977 ADC Irrigation 95.0 64.97
1401 1977 Republic of Korea Ports II 67.0 57.53
1461 1977 KDFC VI Dev. Finance Co. 70.0 0.63
1466 1977 Republic of Korea Heavy Machinery 80.0 23.95
1474 1977 Republic of Korea Vocational Training 23.0 12.74
1503 1978 ADC - Ogseo Stage I Agriculture/Irrigation 36.0 35.31
1507 1978 SMIB II Dev. Finance Co. 55.0 1.82
1530 1978 Republic of Korea Rural Infrastructue II 95.0 54.21
1542 1978 Republic of Korea Railway VI 120.0 28.08
1574 1978 KDB III Dev. Finance Co. 110.0 33.46
1635 1978 KDFC VII Dev. Finance Co. 100.0 14.16
1640 1978 Republic of Korea Highways IV 143.0 125.40
1666 1979 Republic of Korea Chungju Multipurpose 125.0 118.67
1676 1979 Republic of Korea Electronics Technology 29.0 25.54
1749 1979 SMIB III Dev. Finance Co. 60.0 36.60
1758 1979 Republic of Korea Second Gwangju Regional 65.0 65.00
1774 1979 Republic of Korea Population I 30.0 30.00
1778 1979 Korea Electric Co. Power 115.0 115.00
1800 1980 Republic of Korea Education V - Sector Loan 100.0 1nO.00
1829 /a 1980 CNB I Dev. Finance Co. 30.0 30.00
1836 7E 1980 Republic of Korea Railway VII 94.0 94.00
1851 Ic 1980 AFDC Second Agric. Prod. Process 50.0 50.0n
Total 2,905.17 40.0 106.81 1,150.01
of which has been repaid 77=2F. - -- 7TU
Total now outstanding 2,762.89 40.0 104.8
Amount sold 8.83
of which has been repaid 5.95 2.88 - -
Total now held by Bank and IDA
(prior to exchange adjustment) 2,760.01 40.0 104.77
Total undisbursed 1,150.01 - - 1,150.01
/a Effective August 5, 1980.
/b Effective August 29, 1980.
/c Effective September 3, 1980.
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B. Statement of IFC Investments (as of July 31, 1980)
Fiscal Amount ($ million)
Year Obligor Types of Business Loan Equity Total
1968 KDFC Development Financing - 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Pulp and paper 4.5 0.5 5.0/a
1971 Korea Investment
Finance Corp. Capital Market Development - 0.7 0.7
1974 KDFC Development Financing - 0.4 0.4
1974 Korea Investment
Finance Corp. Capital Market Development - 0.3 0.3
1975 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products 16.0 1.3 17.3
1975 Korea Securities
Fincance Corp. Capital Market Development 5.0 0.6 5.6
1975 Tong Yang Nylon
Company, Ltd. Synthetic Fibers 6.9 2.1 9.0
1975 Hae Un Dae Develop-
ment Company, Ltd. Tourism 2.8 0.7 3.5
1976 Korea Investment
Finance Crop. Capital Market Development - 0.4 0.4
1976 Chungju Paper Mfg. Co. Paper 5.0 0.5 5.5
1976 Korea Zinc. Co., Ltd. Zinc 15.0 4.0 19.0
1976 KDFC Development Financing 17.8 - 17.8
1976 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products 10.0 0.4 10.4
1977 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products - 0.2 0.2
1977 KDFC Development Financing - 0.3 0.3
1977 Korea Securities
Finance Corp. Capital Market - 0.5 0.5
1977 Korea Development
Leasing Corp. Capital Market 15.0 0.4 15.4
1978 KDFC Development Financing - 1.1 1.1
1979 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products - 1.7 1.7
1979 KIFC Capital Market - 0.6 0.6
1979 Korea Development
Leasing Corp. 
- 0.2 0.2
1979 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products - 1.5 1.5
1980 Gold Star & Co., Ltd. Electronic Products - 1.8 1.8
1980 Korea Investment
Finance Corp. Capital Market - 0.6 0.6
1980 Korea Securities
Finance Corp. 
- 0.8 0.8
1980 KDFC Development Financing - 2.2 2.2
Total gross commitment 99.4 24.8 124.2
less cancelations, terminations,
repayment and sales 53.7 2.7 56.4
Total commitments now held by IFC 45.7 22.1 67.8
TOTAL undisbursed
/a Cancelled at the request of the Company.
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PROJECTS IN EXECUTION /1
Agricultural Sector
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project;
$13.0 Million Loan of June 7, 1974; Effective Date:
March 19, 1975; Closing Date: June 30, 1980
This project provided long-term funds to the Agriculture and
Fisheries Development Corporation (AFDC) for onlending to subborrowers in
the private sector for the purpose of integrating on-farm production of
fruits and vegetables with modern, hygienic processing facilities, using
land that was idle or underutilized. The vegetables and fruits involved are
mainly asparagus, shiitake (oak mushroom), spinach, mushroom, strawberry and
peach. Implementation of the project was delayed by about 18 months owing
to lack of loan demand for some of the processing facilities included in the
project. However, the project began progressing satisfactorily in
September 1977 when the Bank approved AFDC's proposal to widen the project's
scope to meet changed investor demand. Under the revised scope, AFDC will
financed processing and cold storage of fish, meat, fruits and vegetables,
and also fruit juice extraction and concentration and vegetable drying.
Roughly $36,500 of the loan's proceeds remained undisbursed at the Closing
Date; this amount was cancelled.
Loan No. 1193 Second Integrated Dairy Development Project; $15.0 Million
Loan ot June 4, 19/6; Ettective Date: November 1I, 19/b;
Closing Date: December 31, 1982
The project consists of further development of 400 existing dairy
farms which participated in the first project; the development of 450 new
dairy farms; expansion of existing dairy processing facilities, construction
of a new processing plant; and technical assistance for both farm develop-
ment and processing. Effectiveness was delayed for nearly a year but
implementation has progressed rapidly and the project may be completed ahead
of schedule. The project will benefit 41% more farmers and supply 8% more
cows than was originally estimated. Technical support to the farmers has
been strengthened but more has to be done to improve pasture quality and
establish a feed regime which would ensure the development of a low-cost
dairy industry in Korea. The expansion of processing facilities is
progressing steadily and it is anticipated that the actual capacity then
/1 These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding
the progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report any
problems which are being encountered, and the action being taken to
remedy them. They should be read in this sense, and with the under-
standing that they do not purport to present a balanced evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses in project execution.
ANNEX II
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will be significantly above the original estimate. KDBC's financial
condition improved during the last two years. The general prospects are for a
gradually improving trend. As of July 31, 1980, the loan amount was about
completely disbursed.
Loan No. 1851 Second Agricultural Products Processing Project;
$50 Million Loan of June 2/, M98U; Effective Date:
September 3, 1980; Closing Date: September 30, 1984:
June 30, 1981
The project would support investments in Korea's agroprocessing
subsector. Enterprises engaged in freezing and cold storage, canning,
drying, pickling and other preservations of fruits, vegetables, meat and
fisheries products, oil and extraction, processing of grain based foods, raw
silk spinning, and production of fruit juice based beverages, dairy products,
and animal feeds would be the main subborrowers. The project will benefit
the farmers through widening their market opportunities, provide increased
supplies, better quality and larger variety of processed food throughout the
year to consumers, and create about 5,000 additional jobs. The project
would also contribute to the institutional strengthening of the Agriculture
and Fishery Development Corporation (AFDC).
Loan No. 1319 Miho Watershed Area Development Project; $29.0 Million Loan
of August 5, 19/76; Etective Date: October 21, 19/7;
Closing Date: December 31, 1982
This project, located in the central region of Korea, is being
financed under the first Bank loan for area development in Korea. Con-
struction work is progressing on two of the five major civil works contracts
with the first contract well advanced and providing some irrigation water
this year. Altogether, the five contracts involve construction of 8 large
and 19 small dams, 284 km of main and secondary canals and land development
for irrigating 12,700 ha. The project also involves construction of 80 km
of river channel improvement and 150 km of village access roads, as well as
feasibility studies for a second stage project in the Miho Watershed. The
project is currently two years behind schedule due to major shortfalls in
local budget allocations.
Loan No. 1364 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project Stage II; $95.0 Million
Loan of February 11, 1977; Effective Date: April 22, 1977;
Closing Date: December 31, 1984
The project will provide irrigation and land development on 20,700
ha in the lower reaches of the Yong San River. Project works include an
estuary dam, sea dike, pumping stations, irrigation canals, reclamation of
5,500 ha of tidal lands, conversion of 3,250 ha of uplands for irrigation of
paddy, land consolidation of 3,200 ha, and irrigation of 1,050 ha of up-
lands. Construction of the access roads and a portion of the estuary dam
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has been completed. The main contract for estuary dam construction was
awarded in December 1977, and construction is progressing well with the
closure of the estuary due in March 1981, in line with the appraisal
schedule. However, start of construction on the irrigation subprojects is
two years behind schedule due to shortfalls in local budget allocation.
Loan No. 1503 Ogseo Area Development Project - Stage I; $36.0 Million
Loan of January 4, 1978; Effective Date: March 29, 1978;
Closing Date: June 30, 1983
The project will benefit some 23,000 farm families by providing
new irrigation on 7,100 ha, improved irrigation and drainvge on 3,700 ha and
a more assured water supply on an additional 1,500 ha. Project work
consists of nine pumping stations, 190 km of main and secondary canals and
land development including 5,800 ha of land consolidation, 2,500 ha of
improved drainage (of which 1,500 ha would also be consolidated), 2,200 ha
of tertiary irrigation and conversion of 1,800 ha of upland and forest to
paddy land. Construction will be carried out under seven civil works
contracts and three were awarded in late 1979. The project is currently
behind schedule due to major shortfalls in local budget allocations.
Loan No. 1530 Rural Infrastructure Project II; $95.0 Million Loan of
March 13, 1978; Effective Date: June 8, 1978; Closing
Date: June 30, 1983
The project includes about 46 minor irrigation, 8,300 river
training and 7,400 water supply subprojects as well as a rural telephone
program. The river training and rural telephones components were completed
on schedule in 1979 and the water supply component will be completed in
1980. Design work on the minor irrigation component is complete. The total
area of the irrigation subprojects has been finalized at 9,192 ha. Contracts
have been awarded for all 36 subprojects but construction progress is slow
due to shortfalls in local budget allocations.
Loan No. 1666 Chungju Multipurpose Project; $125.0 Million Loan of
March Z9, 19/9; Effective Date: July 11, 1979; Closing
Date: June 30, 1985
The project would help meet the growing demand for municipal,
industrial and irrigating water in the Han Basin for about 20 years
following its completion in 1984, and would substantially reduce flood
damage, generate an average of 770 million kilowatt hours annually and
provide 460 MW of peaking capacity for Korea's power system. The principal
features of the project are a 90 m high concrete dam across the South Han
River, a power plant containing four 115 MW generating units, and associated
transmission facilities; a reregulating dam about 20 km downstream of the
main dam; relocation of about 100 km of roads and 10 km of railwaj,
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protective works in the reservoir area including the raising of an existing
embankment of a cement plant and other miscellaneous works; implementation
of a resettlement program for some 9,300 families affected by the project;
and consulting services. The major civil works contract was awarded in
December 1979 and progress to date is good.
Industrial Sector
Loan No. 1338 Second Korea Development Bank Project; $82.5 Million Loan,
of which $7.5 Million for the Korea Industrial Leasing
Company, of December 23, 1976; Effective Date: March 21,
1977; Closing Date: December 31, 1980
The project provides $75.0 million to be used by KDB to make sub-
loans to finance direct imports for industrial subprojects during the period
1977-78; the remainder of the loan, $7.5 million, was relent by KDB to its
wholly-owned subsidiary, the Korea Industrial Leasing Corporation (KILC). to
acquire machinery, equipment, facilities and other property to be leased to
investment enterprises. Commitment of funds is progressing as expected.
Loan No. 1461 Sixth Korea Development Finance Corporation Project;
$70.0 Million Loan of June 30, 1911; Eftective Date:
September 15, 1977; Closing Date: December 31, 1981
The loan was made to help cover the foreign exchange requirements
of industrial subprojects to be financed by KDFC subloans in 1977-78.
KDFC's performance has been very satisfactory.
Loan No. 1466 Heawy Machinery Project; $80.0 Million Loan of June 30,
1977; Effective Date: December 1, 19/7; Closing Date:
December 31, 1980
Project cost has increased to $396 million as compared with the
appraisal estimate of $255 million. This is due to increases in scope to
enhance the project's ability to manufacture nuclear power plant; the
devaluation of the US dollar, and domestic inflation. The market prospects
for the project have been affected by licensing of other power plant
manufacturers in Korea. In order to deal with this problem and to strengthen
the financial viability of the project, the Government intends to increase
the capital base of the project sponsor and to consolidate its operations
with another manufacturer. Details are being worked out between the parties
involved and will be the subject of discussions between the Korean
authorities and the Bank in December 1980.
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Loan No. 1507 Second Medium Industry Bank Project; $55.0 Million Loan of
January 4, 1978; Effective Date: March 10, 1978; Closing
Date: December 31, 1982
The project provides $55.0 million to be used by SMIB to help cover
the foreign exchange requirements of industrial subprojects. A portion of
the loan - $20.0 million - was earmarked to assist small-scale, labor-
intensive subprojects creating employment at a gross capital cost per job
not greater than $6,000 or enterprises whose fixed assets are not greater
than $250,000.
Loan No. 1574 Third Korea Development Bank Project; $110 Million Loan of
June 21, 1978; Effective Date: September 14, 1978;
Closing Date: December 31, 1982
The loan would be used to help cover the foreign exchange require-
ments of subprojects to be financed by KDB; apart from direct imports, the
loan would be utilized by KDB to finance the foreign exchange component of
domestically produced capital goods. An amount of up to $10.0 million of
the proceeds of the proposed loan would be made available to KDB's
subsidiary, the Korea Industrial Leasing Corporation Ltd. (KILC), by way of
subloans in order to finance small- and medium-sized leasing projects.
Overall progress is satisfactory.
Loan No. 1635 Seventh Korea Development Finance Corporation Project;
$100.0 million Loan ot December /, 19/8; Effective Date:
February 6, 1979; Closing Date: June 30, 1983
The loan was made to cover the foreign exchange requirements of
subprojects to be financed by KDFC over the years 1979 and 1980. In order
to support relatively labor-intensive enterprises, a component of $20 mil-
lion was earmarked for financing specifically: (a) enterprises with fixed
assets not exceeding $750,000; or (b) projects generating employment at a
fixed investment cost per job not greater than $12,500. Also, in order to
finance small- and medium-sized leasing projects, an amount of up to $10.0
million of the proceeds of the proposed loan will be made available to the
Korea Development Leasing Corporation (KDLC), a leasing company affiliated
to KDFC, by way of subloans.
Loan No. 1676 Electronics Technology Project; $29.0 Million Loan of
March 2, 19/9; Effective Date: June 28, 19/9;
Closing Date: December 31, 1983
After initial delays in finalizing specifications and bidding
documents for engineering, support and research equipment, the project
is progressing satisfactorily. Bids have been received and are being
evaluated for a major proportion of the equipment. The training program
is also under way.
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Loan No. 1749 Third Small and Medium Industry Bank Project; $60 Million
Loan of July 23, 1979; Effective Date: September 26, 1979,
Closing Date: December 31, 1983
Apart from direct imports, the proceeds of the loan would be
utilized by SMIB to finance the foreign exchange component of domestically
produced capital goods. To ensure that a reasonable proportion of the loan
is directed towards small, labor-intensive projects, an amount of $25 mil-
lion of the proceeds of the loan will be earmarked to finance: (a) enter-
prises with fixed assets not exceeding $300,000; or (b) projects generating
employment at a fixed investment cost per job not greater than $8,500. The
loan would assist SMIB in its efforts to support the Government's policy of
increasing the regional dispersal of employment opportunities and of deep-
ening the industrial structure, and also to continue SMIB support of projects
which would complement large-scale manufacturing enterprises.
Loan No. 1829 Citizens National Bank (CNB); $30 Million Loan of May 7,
1980; Effective Date: Ausust 5, 1980, Closing Date:
December 31, 1984
The loan would be used to cover part of the foreign exchange
requirements of subprojects to be financed by the Citizens National Bank
(CNB) over a two year period, and would assist CNB in its efforts to support
the Government's policy in increasing regional dispersal of employment
opportunities and of deepening the industrial structure. Apart from direct
imports, the proceeds of the loan would be utilized by CNB to finance the
foreign exchange components of domestically produced capital goods. The
project would also enable the Bank to help build up CNB's project appraisal
capabilities.
Population Sector
Loan No. 1774 Population Project;$30 Million Loan of December 27, 1979;
Effective Date: March 21, 1980; Closing Date: June 30, 1984
The project will assist the Government to reduce fertility over the
next five years, and simultaneously reduce infant and maternal mortality,
particularly in rural areas. The project has been designed to reach out into
communities with primary care services, particularly maternal and child health
and family planning. The major components are: (a) improving the delivery
of health and family planning services by strengthening and expanding the
delivery network; (b) increasing demand for services by strengthening and
expanding information, education and communication activities in health and
family planning; and (c) improving the program-s evaluation and administra-
tion capacities. The principal beneficiaries will be mothers and children,
primarily in rural areas, who do not have access to services. It is esti-
mated that about 10 million people would be provided primary health care
services under the project, thus lowering fertility, mortality and morbidity.
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Education Sector
Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; $23.0 Million Loan and
Credit No. 394 $20.0 Million Credit of June 13, 1973; Effective Date:
September 10, 1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1979
The project includes assistance for re-equipping 86 educational
institutions at secondary and university levels. The Loan/Credit funds are
mainly used to finance equipment. The Government is financing related civil
works. Although delayed by about two years due to some project content
changes and temporary halting on equipment procurement, the project has now
been satisfactorily completed.
Loan No. 1096 Third Education Project; $22.5 Million Loan of March 31,
1975; Effective Date: June 6, 1975; Closing Date:
June 30, 1981
The project includes assistance for extension and equipping of
nine institutions (technical, agricultural and fisheries) under the Ministry
of Education (MOE) and seven vocational training institutes (VTIs) under the
Administrator of Labor Affairs (ALA). Project implementation is satisfactory.
Physical facilities and the technical assistance program have been completed.
Training operations have commenced in five VTIs. However, equipment procure-
ment under the MOE component is delayed by almost one year because of a
temporary shortage of counterpart funds. This, in turn, caused a postpone-
ment of the Closing Date by one year. Now all equipment contracts have been
awarded and over 80% achieved. Estimated total project cost now slightly
higher (3%) than the appraisal estimate.
Loan No. 1474 Vocational Training Project; $23.0 Million Loan of
July 22, 1977; Effective Date: October 25, 1977;
Closing Date: June 30, 1982
The project includes the establishment of eight new Vocational
Training Institutes (VTIs), equipment for a National Central Vocational
Training Institute (NCVTI) and technical assistance to be provided by UNDP
and Germany. The implementation schedule is now on schedule. All civil
works contracts have been awarded. Two VTIs are now in operation and four
more will be in operation in October 1980. About 80% of equipment has been
awarded and about 60% delivered. All experts are in post and the fellowship
program has been completed. Disbursements have improved significantly and,
as of June 30, 1980, have been over 37% of the total loan. Management per-
formance has also improved.
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Loan No. 1800 Higher Technical Education; $100.0 Million Loan of
February 21, 1980; Effective Date: April 7, 1980;
Closing Date: June 30, 1984
The project is the Bank's first subsector loan in education. It
finances public and private institutions in higher technical education and
will be approximately allocated as followed: $60 million for engineering,
$36 million for technicians and $4 million for technical assistance. The
project include about 10 national programs for staff and curriculum develop-
ment and 55 subprojects for equipment. The objectives of the project are:
(a) to alleviate manpower problems, (b) to improve quality and (c) to reduce
the investment gap between public and private institutions. Initial imple-
mentation of the project is satisfactory with all 10 national programs and
55 subprojects already prepared. Management capability for implementation
has been strengthened with additional staff. Actual performance on teacher
recruitment is about the same as planned. Enrollment increases have been
restrained and the Private Institutions Promotion Act is being enacted.
Disbursement has not yet started.
Tourism Sector
Loan No. 953 Kyongju Tourism Project; $25.0 Million Loan of January 4,
1974; Effective Date: May 6, 1974; Closing Date:
December 31, 1980
The project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multipurpose
dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement and expansion of
the water supply and sewerage and solid waste disposal systems for the city
Kyongju and the resort area; installation of electrical supply and telecom-
munication facilities for the resort area; the construction and/or realign-
ment of about 57 m of roads, infrastructure, including storm water drainage,
environmental sanitation, community facilities, and a golf course; and a
school for training hotel personnel. The first two hotels with 600 rooms
were completed and opened for operation on April 1, 1978. Negotiations with
other private investors are under way for a third hotel and also for apart-
ments and restaurants in the Bomun resort area. The total amount of the
loan is expected to be disbursed by the Closing Date.
Regional Development
Loan No. 1070 Secondary Cities Regional Project; $15.0 Million Loan of
January 15, 1975; Effective Date: August 18, 1975;
Closing Date: September 30, 1980
Implementation of the Secondary Cities Regional Project has essen-
tially been completed. Three housing sites, two access roads, a city
market fishery harbor infrastructure and building complex and associated
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electrical works were completed last year. Installation of refrigeration
and ice handling equipment at the fishery complex which experienced some
delays, has been completed; the fishery complex is fully operational.
Construction of houses at all three sites has been completed and the sites
are fully occupied. Yeosu Water Supply Extension Project is expected to be
completed by mid-1980. After the initial delays, mainly in fulfilling
conditions of effectiveness and establishing the Gwangju Regional
Development Unit, the project has moved extremely well.
Loan No. 1758 Second Gwangju Regional Project; $65.0 Million Loan of
September 27, 1979; Effective Date: February 15, 1980;
Closing Date: June 30, 1984
Implementation on the Second Gwangju Regional Project has started.
The physical works have been divided into 15 subprojects. Civil work
contracts for two subprojects (Mogpo Water Supply, and Gwangju Industrial
Estate Access Road) were awarded in December 1979 and construction works are
underway. Bids are being solicited for five subprojects for which detailed
engineering has been completed. Consultants are expected to complete detailed
designs and contract documents for other subprojects by July 1980. A
detailed implementation plan for the aquaculture program has been prepared;
credits will become available to aquaculture farmers beginning early next
year. Preparation of Terms of Reference for various studies under Technical
Assistance Program are underway. On the whole, project implementation is
satisfactory. Rapid escalating in construction costs in Korea is going to
cause cost overrun problems, which are being addressed.
Transportation Sector
Loan No. 917 Ports Project; $80.0 Million Loan of June 27, 1973;
Effective Date: September 18, 1973; Closing Date:
June 30, 1980
Civil works and provision of equipment financed under the First
Port Project are completed. Final estimated cost is $143 million including
$101 million foreign exchange. The excess foreign exchange requirement over
the $80 million provided by the Bank loan is being provided by a Saudi Fund
for Development loan of $35 million to the Korean Government; this loan was
based upon the revised foreign exchange requirements of $115 million arrived
at following the first large increase in the price of petroleum products.
The balance of the latter loan will be spent on additional civil works which
are now under way.
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Loan No. 1101 Fifth Railway Project; $100.0 Million Loan of April 10,
1975; Effective Date: July 15, 1975; Closing Date:
June 30, 1980
The project will help the Korean National Railraod (KNR) continue
as a major carrier of freight and passengers by providing for: the upgrading,
modernization and expansion of track, rolling stock, motive power, and other
equipment; the improvement of the efficiency of operation; and the strengthen-
ing of its financial position. The main components of the project are: an
increase in station and line capacity and improvements in signaling; acquisi-
tion of rolling stock, diesel and electric locomotives, spare parts and
repair facilities; track renewal and improvement; bridge strengthening;
completion of electrification of 71 km of industrial lines; and other
miscellaneous items. All contracts to be financed from the loan have been
awarded and most of the equipment delivered.
Loan No. 1203 Third Highway Project; $90.0 Million Loan of February 20,
1976; Effective Date: May 17, 1976; Closing Date:
December 31, 1981
The loan provides funds to help finance: (a) the construction,
chiefly on new alignments, including paving, of about 195 km of four
national highways, including supervision of the work by consultants; (b)
paving and improvement, chiefly on present alignments, of nine national
highways totaling about 600 km, including supervision of the work by
consultants; and (c) feasibility studies by consultants of about 1,200 km of
national and provincial roads, to be followed by detailed engineering. All
contracts for construction and paving were completed by June 1979. Feasi-
bility studies by consultants were completed in February 1980 and a contract
for detailed engineering has been negotiated. As of June 30, 1980 disburse-
ments were over 97% of the total loan. The Saudi Fund for Development is
providing a loan of $35 million to assist in financing the project.
Loan No. 1401 Second Ports Project; $67.0 Million Loan of April 28, 1977;
Effective Date: July 27, 1977; Closing Date: December 31,
1982
The project consists of: (a) a 700 m extension of container
berths being financed under the First Ports Project and a 335,000 sq a
expansion of the container stacking area provided under that project with
ancilliary works; rehabilitation of piers 3 and 4, the central wharf, and
lighter wharf No. 5; (b) procurement of container cranes, mobile container
handling equipment, and tugboats; (c) Engineering Consultant Services and
(d) Technical Assistance and Training. Contracts for the extension of
container berths and for rehabilitation of pier No. 4 and lighter warf
No. 5 were let in July and December 1979 respectively, following delay in
appointing the consultants for final engineering. Estimated costs hr-'..e
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increased to $161 million ($98 foreign exchange) compared with the appraisal
estimate of $112 ($70 foreign exchange). KMPA expects to introduce commer-
cial accounting from January 1, 1983. Traffic and specially containerized
general cargo traffic continues to increase at Busan.
Loan No. 1542 Sixth Railway Project; $120.0 Million Loan of April 10,
1978; Effective Date: August 3, 1978; Closing Date:
June 30, 1982
The project would provide KNR with the capacity required to meet
forecast traffic, and reduce operating and maintenance costs. It includes
continued double tracking and electrification of lines, extension of yards
and terminals, continued installation of centralized traffic control, track
and rail renewal, separation of road and rail at crossings, installation of
a permanent way workshop, procurement of diesel locomotives, passenger cars
and freight cars, provision of a new passenger car workshop, installation
of additional telecommunication and power facilities and provision of tech-
nical assistance to KNR. The loan will also finance transport sector
studies. Contracts for about 98% of the equipment to be financed under the
loan have been awarded and most of the equipment is under delivery. The
feasibility of major investments for 1980 and 1981 has been carried out and
the transport sector studies are under way.
Loan No. 1640 Fourth Highway Project; $143.0 Million Loan of December 7,
1918; Effective Date: March 14, 19/9; Closing Date:
December 31, 1982
The project consists of: (a) construction and improvement,
including paving and supervision by consultants, of 36 sections of national
roads totaling about 950 km; (b) construction and improvement, including
paving and supervision by consultants, of 10 sections of provincial roads
totaling about 280 km; (c) procurement of additional road maintenance
equipment for maintaining national roads; (d) a study by consultants of the
institutions involved in the planning, design, maintenance, construction,
administration and financing of provincial and county (gun) roads, and the
preparation of a program for improving the organization and functions of
such institutions, upgrading provincial and gun road maintenance and the
future development of the gun road system, to be followed by detailed
engineering of about 2,000 km of gun roads; and (e) provision of fellowships
for training staff of the Ministry of Construction. Construction of one
road was started in April 1979, and the remaining roads in September 1979
and is proceeding satisfactorily. A contract for the study was signed, and
work started in September 1979. However, due to budgetary constraints, the
construction work is proceeding slower than originally scheduled.
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Loan No. 1836 Seventh Railway Project; $94 Million Loan of May 21,
1980; Effective Date: August 29, 1980; Closing Date:
December 12, 1983
The project focuses on the goals set jointly with Government and
Bank participation on the transport sector, namely to increase the capacity
of the transport system in the most economically efficient way and to
develop and strengthen the institutions dealing with the transport sector.
The main component of the project aims at: (a) initiating the institutional
changes necessary to gradually transform the Korean National Railroad (KNR)
into a public corporation; (b) providing KNR with the capacity required to
meet forecast traffic; and (c) reducing operating and maintenance costs.
The loan will finance rails, track maintenance equipment, breakdown cranes,
passenger cars, freight cars, workshop equipment, technical assistance and
training.
Power Sector
Loan No. 1778 Gojeong Power Project, $115 Million Loan of December 27,
1979; Effective Date: March 21, 1980
Closing Date: December 31, 1984
The project constitutes the next logical step in KECO's power
development program to meet the load growth up to 1986. The project would
provide for the installation of two 500 MW coal/oil-fired units and associated
auxiliary equipment; coal handling and storage facilities, fuel oil tanks,
ash system and storage area, a fuel unloading dock for ships up to 100,000
DWT displacement; a pumping station and a 17 km steel pipe to transport
fresh water to the station; and a 160 km double circuit, 345 KV transmission
line between the power station and Seoul, and related terminal substations
and management consulting services. In September 1979, contracts for the
main equipment which is not being financed by the Bank were signed. Effective
February 1, 1980, power rates were increased on average by 36% and are now
equivalent to about US10 cents a unit. This increase should enable KECO to
meet its 9% rate of return objective.
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KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK
Supplementary Project Data Sheet
Section I - Timetable of Key Events
(a) Time taken to prepare project The project was prepared
through consultations during
regular supervision of the
previous loans to KDB.
(b) Agency which prepared the project: Korea Development Bank
(c) Date of the first Bank mission to
consider the project : November 1979
(d) Departure of appraisal mission : February 1980
(e) Negotiations completed : October 27, 1980
(f) Planned date of effectiveness : April 1, 1981
Section II - Special Bank Implementation Action
No specific action is considered necessary
Section III - Special Conditions
(a) KDB will establish a special unit to monitor the performance of
NIF borrowers and help conduct the NIF study (para. 44);
(b) Financial sector studies and analysis of selected financial sector
issues would be required as to form a basis of a continuing
dialogue between the Government and the Bank (para. 48);
(c) KDB will maintain a debt/equity ratio not exceeding 10:1
(para. 70);
(d) The free-limit on individual subloans will be raised from
$2.5 million to 5 million (para. 70).
(e) A ceiling of $10 million would be set on the size of individual
subloans (para. 70);
(f) KDB would relend the loan proceeds at an interest rate of two
percentage points over the weighted average cost of available
foreign official resources (para. 71).
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